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I.

INTRODUCTION

Joe is strolling down the hygiene products aisle at his local supermarket. While attempting to grab a container of shaving cream from a nearby
shelf, Joe accidently knocks a plastic bottle of aftershave onto the floor,
sending the cap of the bottle bouncing down the aisle. Slightly startled, he
hurriedly grabs the cap to put it back onto the item and is relieved to find
that the bottle was further sealed and did not spill. In replacing what Joe
finds to be somewhat of a unique bottle cap, he notices the word “patent”
followed by a fairly long number pressed onto the bottle’s side in tiny print.
Drifting back to his younger days, Joe recalls a unique liquid dispenser cap
that he and his friend Bill created in one of their high school science classes. Snapping out of his daze and thinking nothing of it, Joe returns the bottle to its shelf and continues his shopping endeavor.
What Joe discovered on that bottle of aftershave is a product patent
number. Generally, these are placed on products to give notice to the public, product competitors, and manufacturers that the maker of this item or its
design has certain patent rights.1 What Joe and many other similarly situated people do not know is that if Joe had discovered that this patent was
expired, he may have been able to file a false marking claim against the
manufacturer of the product as of just a few months ago before a recent
change in the law.2
Over the last few years, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
has handed down a number of decisions3 regarding the False Marking Act
1. See Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(“The marking and false marking statutes exist to give the public notice of patent rights.”).
2. See Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding
that expired patents qualified as “unpatented articles” under the False Marking Act).
3. See infra Part II.B.
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(FMA)4 that have jump-started what became known as a new “cottage industry”5 of “marking trolls.”6 Based on these decisions and the qui tam provision found within the FMA,7 thousands of false marking claims were filed
against product manufacturers, resulting in a slew of complex patent litigation and millions of dollars being dished out in settlement money, court
costs, and damages.8 In order to combat this expensive litigation, defendants in these actions put forth a variety of defenses, calling into question the
validity and constitutionality of the statute’s provisions.9
As this “cottage industry” began to develop, members of the United
States Congress heard the cry of the patent industry and manufacturers; for
years, Congress pushed to amend the FMA to calm the storm.10 After several failed attempts, Congress managed to formulate and pass the LeahySmith America Invents Act (America Invents Act),11 which radically
changed the FMA.
4. 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2006).
5. The term “cottage industry” was first used by the defendant in Bon Tool and
was discussed by the Federal Circuit in its opinion. Bon Tool, 590 F.3d at 1303. Many commentators on the recent false marking issues have used this term to refer to the influx of qui
tam litigants filing false marking claims that have not suffered any injury. See, e.g., Eric
Schlichter & Robert Calico, Avoiding the False Marking “Cottage Industry”; Recent
Changes by the CAFC Present a Case for Periodic Review of Patent Portfolios, INTELL.
PROP. TODAY, 16 (June 2010), http://www.iptoday.com/issues/2010/06/avoiding-falsemarking-ucottage-industry-u.asp.
6. The term “marking trolls” was also discussed by the Federal Circuit in Bon
Tool, 590 F.3d at 1303, and many commentators widely used this term to label false marking
qui tam relators. See, e.g., Mark H. Anania & Carissa L. Rodrigue, Combating the Rise of
False Marking Trolls, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Sept. 2011, at 3, 6. The term is an offshoot of “patent trolls,” which refers to persons or entities that gain patents on inventions
with “no intention of commercializing” by accusing companies of infringement and filing
lawsuits against them. Maxwell J. Petersen, Patent Law Reform: Highlights of the LeahySmith America Invents Act, NW. SUBURBAN B. ASS’N NEWSBRIEFS, Nov. 2011, at 8, 9.
7. 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) (2006) (“Any person may sue for the penalty . . . .”). Stated
well by the Supreme Court: “Qui tam is short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege
quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which means ‘who pursues this action on our Lord
the King’s behalf as well as his own.’” Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel.
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769 n.1 (2000). Qui tam provisions allow for a private person, also
known as the “relator,” to bring a civil action both for that person and for the U.S. Government against a violator of a statue “in the name of the Government.” Id. at 769.
8. See generally Kirsten R. Rydstrom et al., Burning Down the Courthouse: Qui
Tam Actions Under Section 292 of the False Marking Statute, 11 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. &
POL’Y, Spring 2011, at 1; see also infra Part II.B.
9. See, e.g., Anania & Rodrigue, supra note 6, at 5.
10. The many attempts to modify Section 292 go back to early 2009 with the Patent
Reform Act of 2009. See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009); see also
infra Part IV.A.
11. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to
be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 292).

192

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

33

To begin, this Comment will provide background on false marking
claims and recap how this “cottage industry” recently came about. This
Comment will then analyze the constitutionality of the FMA before it was
recently amended and argue that the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court
would have found it constitutional under Article II of the United States
Constitution.12 Next, this piece will analyze the newly passed America Invents Act by discussing its changes to Section 292 and highlighting its possible shortcomings regarding the purpose of the FMA. Finally, this Comment will provide possible fixes to the statute that will address further prevention of future “troll” problems while still preserving the original purpose
of the FMA.
II.

FALSE MARKING HISTORY: A BREEDING GROUND FOR THE FALSE
MARKING TROLLS

The concept of false marking and its alleged public harms are not, by
any means, new. The FMA dates back to the Patent Act of 1842, which
fined persons that labeled unpatented articles with an intent to deceive the
general public.13 A few decades later, Congress extended the definition of
false marking in the Patent Act of 1870 to objects that were labeled with the
word “patent” or “any word of like import, with intent to imitate or counterfeit the mark or device of the patentee . . . for the purpose of deceiving the
public.”14 In 1952, Congress made sweeping changes to the Patent Act and
codified the false marking provision as 35 U.S.C. § 292 (Section 292).15
The revisions maintained most aspects of the Patent Act but increased the

12. The applicable section and clause of the Constitution states that the President is
to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, and “shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
13. Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, § 5, 5 Stat. 543; see also Laura N. Arneson, Comment, Defining Unpatented Article: Why Labeling Products with Expired Patent Numbers
Should Not Be False Marking, 95 MINN. L. REV. 650, 653-54 (2010).
14. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198-217; Arneson, supra note 13, at 654.
The Patent Act continues, stating, in relevant part, that a false marker:
[S]hall be liable for every such offense to a penalty of not less than one
hundred dollars, with costs; one moiety of said penalty to the person
who shall sue for the same, and the other to the use of the United States,
to be recovered by suit in any district court of the United States within
whose jurisdiction such offense may have been committed.
Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198-217.
15. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 9 (1952), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2403, available at http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/Senate_Report_No_1979.pdf.
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maximum fine to $500 (from $100) and made the statute “an ordinary criminal action” and “an informer action.”16
A.

SECTION 292 AND ITS PURPOSE

Not too long ago, subsection (a) of Section 292 prohibited marking or
affixing to any article “patent” or a similar term when no such patent existed “for the purpose of deceiving the public,” and tendered a fine of “not
more than $500 for every such offense.”17 Subsection (b) included a qui tam
provision, stating that “[a]ny person may sue for the penalty, in which event
one-half shall go to the person suing and the other to the use of the United
States.”18 These provisions alone did not necessarily change the effectiveness or the original purpose of the FMA, and few cases or controversies
arose subsequent to the FMA’s codification.19

16. Id. at 22. An “informer action” is typically “synonymous with a qui tam law.”
Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714, 721 (E.D. Va. 2009), vacated in part on
other grounds, 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 292(a) (2006). The section read in full:
Whoever, without the consent of the patentee, marks upon, or affixes to,
or uses in advertising in connection with anything made, used, offered
for sale, or sold by such person within the United States, or imported by
the person into the United States, the name or any imitation of the name
of the patentee, the patent number, or the words “patent,” “patentee,” or
the like, with the intent of counterfeiting or imitating the mark of the patentee, or of deceiving the public and inducing them to believe that the
thing was made, offered for sale, sold, or imported into the United States
by or with the consent of the patentee; or Whoever marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in advertising in connection with any unpatented article,
the word “patent” or any word or number importing that the same is patented for the purpose of deceiving the public; or Whoever marks upon,
or affixes to, or uses in advertising in connection with any article, the
words “patent applied for,” “patent pending,” or any word importing that
an application for patent has been made, when no application for patent
has been made, or if made, is not pending, for the purpose of deceiving
the public—Shall be fined not more than $500 for every such offense.
Id.
18. 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) (2006). The Federal Circuit reaffirmed that this was a qui
tam provision in Solo Cup, 608 F.3d at 1359, and subsequently held that qui tam relators
under Section 292 had Article III standing to sue. Stauffer v. Brooks Bros. Inc., 619 F.3d
1321, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2010). For more discussion on this point, see infra Part II.B.
19. See Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (stating, when referring to the FMA, that “[t]he case law of this circuit on the statute
in suit is sparse”); see also Adam H. Charnes & Chad D. Hansen, “False Patent Marking”
Qui Tam Lawsuits Are Constitutionally Suspect, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, 1 (Dec. 17, 2010),
http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/12-1710Charnes_LegalBackgrounder.pdf. (“For more than 150 years, the false marking statute
was virtually dormant, with only a handful of decisions addressing the claim.”).
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Section 292 worked hand in hand with 35 U.S.C. § 287 (Section 287),
and to understand the purpose of the FMA, it is important to recognize the
principles behind Section 287.20 Section 287 generally puts forth the instructions and methods by which an article may be marked in order to provide the public notice of its patented status and avoid a violation of Section
292.21 In order to incentivize this marking obligation, “Congress designed §
287 so that a patentee can only recover damages for infringing sales that
occurred after it gave notice of its patent rights.”22 Specifically, Section 287
provides that patentees cannot recover for any damages they have accrued
against an infringer for the time period “that predates the accused infringer
receiving actual notice from the patentee of the accused infringement.”23
Although the purposes of Section 287 are similar to those of Section
292, the latter provision was created to avoid abuse of the former.24 Ever
since its original enactment, courts have recognized that Section 292 was
intended “to prevent deception on the public” and guard the public’s right
to “use such articles” that are not actually patented.25 The Federal Circuit
more recently articulated some of the main purposes of the FMA in Forest
Group v. Bon Tool Co.26 Section 292 encourages manufacturers to give the
public “notice of patent rights” so as not to “deter innovation and stifle
competition in the marketplace.”27 False marking may also deter scientific
research and initiate “unnecessary investment in design around or costs
incurred to analyze the validity or enforceability of a patent.”28 A manufacturer can then “reap” the benefits “of perceived quality without actually

20. Section 287 was also amended under the America Invents Act, but any significant changes will be addressed in Part IV.B.3.
21. Bonnie Grant, Deficiencies and Proposed Recommendations to the False Marking Statute: Controlling Use of the Term “Patent Pending,” 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 283, 28587 (2004).
22. Arneson, supra note 13, at 673.
23. Schlichter & Calico, supra note 5. Because Section 287 “does not expressly
define what is required to comply with the marking statute,” courts have generally required
marking to be “consistent and continuous,” and those that neglect to mark some articles or
stop marking articles for a period of time may also not be able to recover all infringement
damages. Corey McCaffrey, Comment, The Virtues of Virtual Marking in Patent Reform,
105 NW. U. L. REV. 367, 373-74 (2011).
24. See McCaffrey, supra note 23, at 374.
25. Nichols v. Newell, 18 F. Cas. 199, 199-200 (C.C.D. Mass. 1853) (No. 10,245)
(“To guard the public right to use such articles as have not been patented—to prevent deception on the public, by assertions that articles, not entitled to this privilege, have been patented . . . [t]his being the purpose of the law . . . .”).
26. Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1302-03 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
27. Id. at 1302.
28. Id. at 1303.
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hav[ing] a patent,”29 while the public essentially loses out on competition
leaving an “undeserved monopoly on the product for the false marker.”30
B.

“FALSE MARKING TROLLS” ON THE MARCH

Over its extensive existence, the FMA was seldom used and false
marking was rarely litigated.31 As of mid-September 2011, Section 292 was
actually one of only a handful of qui tam statutes left on the books, three of
which were still active.32 It was not until Arcadia Machine & Tool, Inc. v.
Sturm, Ruger & Co.33 and twenty years later in Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp.34 that Section 292 received any attention at all. Clontech
promulgated the fairly simple elements of false marking, 35 but qui tam relators did not yet seem to pay much attention.36 Only a few dozen suits were
29. Grant, supra note 21, at 289.
30. Christopher G. Granaghan, Note, Off the Mark: Fixing the False Marking Statute, 89 TEX. L. REV. 477, 480 (2010). Granaghan notes that “monopolies tend to increase
prices and decrease output, so the public will pay more” overall and be further harmed. Id. at
481. More on the purposes and the importance of the FMA will be discussed in Parts IV and
V.
31. Arneson, supra note 13, at 660; see also Paul W. Garrity & Amanda Zablocki,
High Tide for False Patent Marking Claims?, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., 33 (July 2010),
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType=view&artMonth=July&artYear=20
11&EntryNo=12433 (characterizing Section 292 as a “long-dormant statute”).
32. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40785, QUI TAM: THE FALSE
CLAIMS ACT AND RELATED FEDERAL STATUTES 1 (2009), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40785.pdf (listing the False Claims Act, the False Marking Act, and the Indian protection provisions of 25 U.S.C. § 201 as active qui tam statutes).
The Supreme Court in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769 n.1 (2000), when discussing the False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. §§
3729-3733) conveniently listed the other qui tam provisions that were still in existence as of
May 2000: 25 U.S.C. § 81 and § 201 (protecting Indians), 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) (False Marking), 18 U.S.C. § 962 (regarding arming vessels against friendly nations), and 46 U.S.C. §
723 (removing undersea treasure from the Florida coast).
33. Arcadia Mach. & Tool, Inc. v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 786 F.2d 1124, 1125 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (granting summary judgment to the defendant because Arcadia could not “produce any evidence of intent to deceive the public”).
34. Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (affirming in part, reversing in part, vacating in part, and remanding a complex marking case in which Clontech Labs alleged that Invitrogen falsely marked their “RNase H
deficient Reverse Transcriptase [] polypeptides” and their “cDNA library products”).
35. Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1352 (“[W]hen an unpatented article is marked with the
word ‘patent’ or any word or number that imports that the article is patented, and such marking is for the purpose of deceiving the public, the fine is invoked.”).
36. See M. Andrew Holtman et. al., Stemming the Tide of False Marking Cases,
BLOOMBERG
LAW
REP.
(May
16,
2011),
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=9e84a78e-3cd7-4065abf3-13837afc3dbb (stating that only about thirty lawsuits were filed under Section 292 in
2009); see also Michael R. O’Neill, False Patent Marking Claims: The New Threat to Busi-
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filed under Section 292 in the years following Clontech, and most of them
came after an important case, Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co.,37 was filed in the
Eastern District of Virginia.38
The Federal Circuit effectively unleashed the trolls in December of
2009 with the Bon Tool decision.39 In Bon Tool, the court, reading the plain
language of Section 292, held that the penalty under Section 292 should “be
imposed for every offense of marking any unpatented article” and on “a per
article basis.”40 Because the chances of a competitor seeing a falsely
marked article that deters his efforts to compete with the product would
increase with every article, the court reasoned that those injuries to the public that the FMA was designed to prevent occurred each time an article was
falsely marked and put into the public domain.41 To limit the possible windfall judgments that may result from this interpretation of the FMA, the court
also included that district courts would have discretion in assessing “the per
article fine at any amount up to $500 per article,” even if it meant awarding
a fraction of a penny per offense.42 Ironically, the court also discussed the
possibility that its decision could create “a new cottage industry of false
marking litigation” by “marking trolls” that could bring Section 292 claims
solely for personal gain.43
Six months later in Pequignot v. Solo Cup, the Federal Circuit threw
another bone under the bridge to the trolls.44 The court held that articles that
were imprinted with a “now-expired patent” were also “unpatented” because it was difficult for the public to determine the validity of the patent,
which therefore continued to impose costs on the public.45 The court also
stated that false statements and knowledge that such statements were false
created a “rebuttable presumption of intent to deceive the public,” but limited this by noting that this presumption was weaker with articles with exness, 8 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 22, 22 (2010) (“Before the Bon Tool decision, very few
people had ever heard of § 292 of the Patent Act or false patent marking claims.”).
37. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714 (E.D. Va. 2009), vacated in
part on other grounds, 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
38. See McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP, False Patent Marking:
District Court, http://www.falsemarking.net/district.php (last visited Oct. 3, 2011) (Solo Cup
was filed on Sept. 5, 2007).
39. Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (affirming the district court’s finding of requisite knowledge to allege a violation of Section 292,
but vacating its award of damages and remanding for a recalculation of fines under the
FMA). The vast majority of commentators label the Bon Tool decision as the starting point
of the “flood” of litigation under Section 292. See, e.g., Granaghan, supra note 30, at 477.
40. Bon Tool, 590 F.3d at 1301.
41. Id. at 1303.
42. Id. at 1302, 1304.
43. Id. at 1303 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. See, e.g., Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
45. Id. at 1361-62.
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pired patents and could be negated by “a good faith belief that an action
[i.e., continuing to mark products with expired patent numbers] is appropriate.”46 Ultimately, this decision allowed for the “average Joe” (like the Joe
in the Introduction supra) to grab products off the grocery shelf with expired patent numbers and file a claim under Section 292 if he could prove
the necessary intent.47
The Federal Circuit essentially affirmed that the average Joe could do
just that a month and a half later in Stauffer v. Brooks Bros.48 Applying the
Supreme Court’s “injury-in-fact” test in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife49
and citing the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens,50 the court held that even if
qui tam relators do not suffer a personal injury, they nonetheless have
standing under Section 292’s qui tam provision because Section 292 “operates as a statutory assignment of the United States’ rights.”51 Because any
violation of the statute constituted an injury to the United States, and these
individuals were given by Congress the right to half of the statutory penalty, these assignees automatically had “standing to assert the injury in fact
suffered by the assignor.”52
The result of these three decisions was disastrous for manufacturers,
and by the time the Federal Circuit had its next opportunity to offer an opinion regarding Section 292, the march of the trolls was in full swing.53 “In

46. Id. at 1362-64. The court ultimately found that Solo Cup adequately rebutted
this presumption with its good faith reliance on its counsel’s advice regarding the disputed
marking. Id. at 1364-65.
47. See, e.g., S.F. Tech. v. Reckitt Benkiser Inc., No. 5:10-cv-04989-JF/PSG, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32333, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011) (dismissing SF Tech’s Section
292 claim because its allegations only suggested “that Reckitt may have been negligent in
keeping products with expired patents on the shelf”).
48. Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., 619 F.3d 1321, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (reversing
and remanding the district court’s decision that denied standing to the plaintiff Stauffer and
denied the U.S. government’s right to intervene).
49. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). To show injury
under Article III, the injury must be “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent,
not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’”; there has to be “a causal connection between the injury
and the conduct complained of”; and, it must also be “‘likely’ . . . that the injury will be
‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” Id.
50. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 77778 (2000) (using the long history of qui tam claims and the theoretical justifications for such
claims to find that the False Claims Act’s qui tam provision was constitutional under Article
III).
51. Stauffer, 619 F.3d at 1325.
52. Id. at 1327-28 (“Stauffer’s standing arises from his status as ‘any person,’ and
he need not allege more for jurisdictional purposes.”).
53. See Kelsey I. Nix & Laurie N. Stempler, Federal Circuit Ignites Interest in
False Patent Marking Lawsuits, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS, Oct. 2010, at 35, available at
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2010 alone, almost 800 false marking claims were filed,”54 many by qui
tam relators.55 In the first quarter of 2011, over 200 more of these suits were
filed.56 Hundreds more were filed after that,57 and it appeared that the end
was nowhere in sight. According to the United States Department of Justice, over $3.4 million in settlement money was paid to the federal government from Section 292 claims in 2010 alone, meaning that a total of more
than $6.8 million was paid out by companies and manufacturers in settlements that year.58 This number had been surpassed by the end of September
2011, when the government had received over $7.5 million in settlement
money, and companies had dished out a total of more than $15 million.59
Nearly 1300 total cases had been filed60 before the Federal Circuit’s
decision in In re BP Lubricants USA Inc.61 in March of 2011, which ultimately involved the circuit’s last important interpretation of Section 292
before effective congressional action. In In re BP, the court reaffirmed that
the particular pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (FRCP) applied to Section 292 in order to show intent to
defraud or deceive the public.62 In order to “assure that only viable claims
alleging fraud or mistake are allowed to proceed to discovery,” a false
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2010/October/35.pdf (reporting that, just in the first
nine months of 2010, false marking claims accounted for fifteen percent of all patent cases).
54. Holtman
et
al.,
supra
note
36
(gathering
statistics
from
http://www.falsemarking.net/district.php); see also Charnes & Hansen, supra note 19, at 1
(“By the end of October 2010, the number of false marking suits filed in 2010 exceeded
500.”). This is in stark contrast to the previous years; no false marking claims were filed in
2007, four were filed on 2008, and seventeen were filed in 2009. O’Neill, supra note 36, at
28.
55. One of the more notorious qui tam relators was Thomas Simonian, who was
reported as filing at least twenty-seven different false marking suits involving expired patents in one day (February 26, 2010). Matthew Marquardt, A New Breed of Patent Troll?
False Patent Marking in the United States, CANADIAN BRIEFINGS, Sept. 2010, at S4.
56. Holtman
et
al.,
supra
note
36
(gathering
statistics
from
http://www.grayonclaims.com/false-marking-case-information/).
57. See Justin E. Gray, False Marking Case Information, GRAY ON CLAIMS,
http://www.grayonclaims.com/false-marking-case-information/. (last updated Dec. 20,
2011).
58. Settlement Payments Received for Section 292 Cases—2010, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST.,
8,
http://www.justice.gov/civil/common/elecread/2010/292%20Payment%20Chart%202010%2
0through%20Dec%2031%202010.pdf. (last visited Oct. 3, 2011).
59. Settlement Payments Received for Section 292 Cases—2011, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST.,
25,
27,
http://www.justice.gov/civil/common/elecread/2011/FalsePatent%20Marking%20Summary
%202011.pdf. (last visited Oct. 3, 2011).
60. Rydstrom et al., supra note 8, at 1.
61. In re BP Lubricants USA Inc., 637 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (granting a writ
of mandamus to address the pleading requirements under Section 292).
62. Id. at 1309, 1312.
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marking complaint must “provide some objective indication to reasonably
infer that the defendant was aware that the patent expired” and could not
merely put forth conclusory statements of the requisite intent.63 There is
evidence that the In re BP decision might have slightly calmed the false
marking storm,64 but the trolls remained on the march.
“By filing claims, relators place false markers between a rock and [a]
hard place; they must decide between costly litigation with the risk of colossal penalties or forking over settlement cash to make the claim go
away.”65 To avoid the high cost of patent litigation and settlement, defendant manufacturers raised a plethora of defenses and maintained other strategies to avoid Section 292’s fines including: challenging Article III standing,
filing 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss and for summary judgments in failure to
plead fraudulent intent,66 filing motions to transfer under 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a),67 and even filing declaratory judgment actions.68 The most promising and most recent defense that defendants put forth was challenging the
constitutionality of Section 292 under Article II’s “Take Care Clause” and
“Appointments Clause.”69 Generally, defendants argued that Section 292
infringed on the executive branch’s power to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed and to appoint officers by not providing sufficient government control over false marking claims.70
With the exception of two district courts,71 the overwhelming majority
of courts found Section 292 constitutional under both clauses.72 As of the
63. Id. at 1301-11.
64. Garrity & Zablocki, supra note 31 (noting that the average settlement in 2011
was about one-third less than that of 2010 and alleging that the false marking surge was
“rapidly losing momentum”).
65. Rydstrom et al., supra note 8, at 4.
66. Id. at 5.
67. Anania & Rodrigue, supra note 6, at 4.
68. Nilay Choksi & Timothy R. Holbrook, 2009-2010 Year in Review of Patent
Law, in 1 PAT. LITIG. 2010 251, 271 (2010).
69. Holtman et al., supra note 36 (“Constitutional challenges have primarily focused on the “Take Care” and “Appointments” Clauses of Article II of the U.S. Constitution.”). See, e.g., Hollander v. Ranbaxy Labs. Inc., 804 F. Supp. 2d 344, 346 (E.D. Pa. 2011)
(“The Court is now faced with the latest challenge to the False Marking Statute— whether §
292(b) violates the Take Care Clause of Article II . . . .”).
70. See, e.g., Hy Cite Corp. v. Regal Ware, Inc., No. 10-cv-168-wmc, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 55011, at *11-12 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 15, 2011) (“Defendants contend that plaintiff cannot pursue its false markings claim under § 292(b) because the statute violates both
the ‘Take Care’ and ‘Appointments’ clauses of the Constitution by failing to provide the
federal government with any control over litigation brought under this qui tam provision. In
other words, the statute does not give the government enough, if any, control of a person’s
false patent marking action to comply with the above clauses.”).
71. The two cases are Unique Product Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc., 765
F. Supp. 2d 997 (N.D. Ohio), vacated as moot by Unique Prod. Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade
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beginning of September 2011, there were two pending cases in the Federal
Circuit, both of which raised the issue of Section 292’s constitutionality
under Article II.73 The court heard oral arguments in July 2011 on the first
case74 and was expected to rule on the issues in that case as early as the end
of 2011, but both were eventually dismissed as moot due to the retroactive
application of the America Invents Act.75
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF QUI TAM ACTIONS UNDER ARTICLE II

District courts have dealt with the constitutionality of Section 292 in a
variety of ways. Courts were reluctant to stay their proceedings in the hope
that the Federal Circuit would soon decide the issue with the pending appeals,76 and a few districts managed to bypass the complex problem.77 The

Valve, Inc., 462 F. App’x 967 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and Rogers v. Tristar Products, Inc., 793 F.
Supp. 2d 711 (E.D. Pa. 2011). They will be discussed further in Part III.
72. See Emmert Second Ltd. P’ship v. Marshalltown Co., CIV-10-12-C, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 103537, at *12 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 12, 2011) (When faced with whether §
292(b) violates the Take Care Clause, the majority of courts have found that the provision
does not violate the Constitution.”). This Comment will focus on the Take Care Clause as
every court that has assessed both the False Claims Act (FCA) and the FMA under the Appointments clause has found them constitutional under that clause. See, e.g., United States ex
rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Gen. Electric Co., 41 F.3d 1032, 1041 (6th Cir. 1994)
(“[T]he relator’s ‘position is without tenure, duration, continuing emolument, or continuous
duties.’ Therefore, the relator is not an ‘officer’ within the meaning of the Appointments
Clause.” (citation omitted) (quoting Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890))).
73. These two cases were Unique Product Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc.,
813 F. Supp. 2d 854, 857-58 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (finding Section 292 unconstitutional), vacated as moot by Unique Prod. Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc., 462 F. App’x 967
(Fed. Cir. 2012), and United States ex rel. FLFMC, LLC v. Wham-O, Inc., No. 10cv0435,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78253 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2010) (dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for
lack of standing), vacated as moot by No. 2011-1067, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 21224, at *3
(Fed. Cir. Oct. 19, 2011). The plaintiff in Wham-O had appealed the dismissal of its complaint, and Wham-O had raised the argument that Section 292 violated Article II as a defense. Garrity & Zablocki, supra note 31.
74. Rogers v. Tristar Prods., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d 711, 719 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 2011)
(“The constitutionality of section 292(b) is also before the Federal Circuit in United States ex
rel. FLFMC, LLC v. Wham-O, Inc. . . . and oral argument is currently set for July 7,
2011.”).
75. See Anania & Rodrigue, supra note 6, at 5 (“A decision by the Federal Circuit
in Wham-O is expected in late 2011 or early 2012.”); supra note 73.
76. See, e.g., Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc. v. Cabela’s Inc., No. 09–CV–102–
H (WMC), 2011 WL 3268080, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 29, 2011) (finding that a stay was not
warranted because a Federal Circuit decision in Wham-O may not apply to the current litigation and trial was less than four months away); Battenfeld Techs., Inc. v. Birchwood Labs.,
Inc., No. 2:11–cv–04099–NKL, 2011 WL 4088901, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 14, 2011) (denying a motion to stay because “the timing and decision of the Federal Circuit is only speculative at this moment and . . . the interest in judicial efficiency and allowing litigants access to
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vast majority of districts that have ruled on the issue, however, found that
Section 292’s provisions were clearly constitutional under Article II for
different reasons.78
A.

DISTRICT COURT APPROACHES

1.

Pequignot v. Solo Cup

Section 292’s constitutionality under Article II was first challenged by
the defendant in Solo Cup while the case was still at the district court level.79 When discussing the widespread agreement among the circuits regarding the constitutionality of the False Claims Act (FCA) under Article II and
Justice John Paul Stevens’s dissent in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources (which was joined by Justice David Souter), the district court found
that the long history of qui tam statutes in America and the case law analyzing the FCA affirmed that such provisions were likely constitutional.80 The
court stated that Section 292 was a civil action, as opposed to a criminal
one, and therefore did not go to “the heart of the Executive’s constitutional
duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.”81 This constitutional
obligation could then “be satisfied with a significantly lesser degree of control” than what was required in Morrison v. Olson,82 as promulgated by the
Supreme Court.83 The district court then, following the appropriate circuit
court case law, applied the “sufficient control” test from Morrison to the

the court outweighs the potential simplification of the issue that a Federal Circuit ruling
could bring”).
77. See, e.g., S.F. Tech. v. Reckitt Benkiser Inc., No. 5:10-cv-04989-JF/PSG, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32333, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011) (declining to decide the constitutional issue because the plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed on other grounds); Turek v.
Merck & Co., No. 3:10-cv-00907-MJR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64946, at *10 (S.D. Ill. June
20, 2011) (declining to address the constitutional challenge until after the plaintiff had filed
an amended complaint).
78. See, e.g., Simonian v. Allergan, Inc., No. 10-2414, 2011 WL 1599292, at *12
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2011) (“Unique Product Solutions is contrary to the overwhelming weight
of case law, which holds that Section 292(b) is constitutional.”).
79. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714, 752 (E.D. Va. 2009), vacated
in part on other grounds, 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Solo argues that if Pequignot is
found to have standing to sue under § 292(b) as a qui tam relator, maintenance of this action
would violate the constitutional separation of powers doctrine, specifically the Take Care
clause of Article II, § 3.”).
80. Id. at 724-26.
81. Id. at 726-27 (quoting Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749, 755
(5th Cir. 2001)).
82. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988).
83. Solo Cup, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 727.
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FMA, found that the statute provided sufficient government control under
the test, and held that the FMA was constitutional.84
2.

Other District Courts Finding Section 292 Constitutional

Solo Cup’s reasoning was used to affirm Section 292’s constitutional
validity in at least one case85 before the Northern District of Ohio’s decision
in Unique Product Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc.86 In Hy Cite
Corp. v. Regal Ware, Inc.,87 published after the Unique decision but without
discussing it, the Western District of Wisconsin followed the reasoning of
Solo Cup in concluding that Section 292 was not “invoking the executive’s
core function” and there was sufficient government control over qui tam
false marking claims.88 The court in Regal Ware also held that because qui
tam litigators were essentially assignees of a government claim for false
patent marking they were not officers of the United States under Article
II.89
In Public Patent Foundation, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline Consumer
Healthcare, L.P.,90 a district court in New York, also citing Solo Cup, found
sufficient safeguards built into the FMA to find it constitutional.91 The court
84. Id. at 728-29 (noting that the fact that the executive branch intervened in the
case and supported the qui tam action was illustrative of the government’s sufficient control
over the litigation).
85. See Shizzle Pop, LLC v. Wham-O, Inc., No. 10 CV 03491, 2010 WL 3063066,
at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2010) (finding the district court’s reasoning in Solo Cup regarding
Section 292’s constitutionality persuasive). In Shizzle Pop, the court also disposed of an
argument regarding the Appointments Clause in citing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United
States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 758 (9th Cir. 1993), which found that qui tam
relators did “not exercise enough authority to be considered an officer who must be appointed by the President.” Id. at *3.
86. Unique Prod. Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 997
(N.D. Ohio 2011), vacated as moot by Unique Prod. Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc.,
462 F. App’x 967 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
87. Hy Cite Corp. v. Regal Ware, Inc., No. 10-cv-168-wmc, 2011 WL 1206768
(W.D. Wis. Mar. 15, 2011).
88. Id. at *4-5.
89. Id. at *5. As noted earlier, every court that has assessed the FCA and Section
292 under the Appointments Clause has found them constitutional, typically citing the Supreme Court in Auffmordt noted above or United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511-12
(1878). This Comment will therefore limit the rest of the discussion to the Take Care Clause
question. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 265 F.3d 1157, 1174
(10th Cir. 2001) (“Relators are not entitled to the benefits of officeholders, such as drawing a
government salary. [Their position does not] ‘embrace[] the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties, and the latter were continuing and permanent, not occasional or temporary.’” (quoting Germaine, 99 U.S. at 511-512)).
90. Pub. Patent Found., Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline Consumer Healthcare, L.P., No. 09
CV 5881, 2011 WL 1142917 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2011).
91. Id. at *3.
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discussed and distinguished the Unique court’s holding by finding that Section 292 claims were civil in form, even though they arose under a criminal
statute.92 With a more substantial analysis, the Northern District of Illinois
in Luka v. Procter & Gamble Co.93 agreed with the New York court and
Solo Cup, holding that the FMA was not a “criminal action,” and Morrison
did not apply with much force.94 This same reasoning was used again by the
Northern District of Illinois in Simonian v. Allergan, Inc.95 The Luka court
also highlighted that “[i]t is commonplace for federal statutes, even criminal statutes, to contain civil enforcement mechanisms that permit private
parties to sue to enforce statutory prohibitions,” that qui tam relators fell
under this rationale as assignees of a government claim, and that the Supreme Court expressly held this constitutional in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources.96
The Southern District of Illinois, which ultimately sidestepped the
constitutional issue, noted that the Unique court followed the lead of Sixth
Circuit case law in applying Morrison, a requirement that was not necessary
in the Seventh Circuit.97 The court further stated that the Federal Circuit
was likely to find the FMA constitutional regardless.98
In early June 2011, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Rogers v.
Tristar Products, Inc. followed the Unique court’s decision and reasoning.99
However, more recent district court decisions still affirmed Solo Cup’s reasoning and were able to distinguish both Rogers and Unique using the
Southern District of Illinois’s reasoning as stated above.100

92. Id. at *4.
93. Luka v. Procter & Gamble Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 712, 722 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
94. Id. at 720-22.
95. Simonian v. Allergan, Inc., No. 10 C 02414, 2011 WL 1599292, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 28, 2011) (finding that even if the direct-control test in Morrison does apply, the FMA
has sufficient safeguards allowing for government control).
96. Luka, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 719.
97. See Ford v. Hubbell, Inc., No. 10 CV 513, 2011 WL 1259707, at *3 (S.D. Ill.
Mar. 28, 2011) (discussing how the Unique court was applying the “sufficient control” test
from Morrison because it was used by the Sixth Circuit in United States ex. rel. Taxpayers
Against Fraud v. Gen. Electric Co., 41 F.3d 1032, 1041 (6th Cir. 1994), and because the
Federal Circuit had not rejected the application of Morrison to Section 292).
98. Id.; see also Buehlhorn v. Universal Valve Co., Inc., No. 10-559-GPM, 2011
WL 1259712, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2011) (using the same analysis as in Ford, 2011 WL
1259707, at *3).
99. Rogers v. Tristar Prods., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d 711, 724-25 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
100. See Emmert Second Ltd. P’ship v. Marshalltown Co., CIV-10-12-C, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 102409, at *13-15 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 9, 2011); Emmert Second Ltd. P’ship v.
Marshalltown Co., CIV-10-12-C, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103537, at *13-17 (W.D. Okla.
Sept. 12, 2011); Hollander v. Ranbaxy Labs. Inc., 804 F. Supp. 2d 344, 353-56 (E.D. Pa.
2011).
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Unique Product Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc. and Rogers v.
Tristar

As mentioned above, there were only two courts that found Section
292 unconstitutional under Article II, and they used generally the same reasoning.101 The Unique court stated that it saw no difference between a relator filing a claim on behalf of the government and the government filing a
complaint itself.102 After concluding that Section 292 was criminal, partly
using Federal Circuit interpretation,103 the court followed the Sixth Circuit
in applying Morrison to the fullest extent.104 The Unique court summarized
its findings as such:
Any private entity . . . can file a criminal lawsuit in the
name of the United States, without getting approval from or
even notifying the Department of Justice. The case can be
litigated without any control or oversight by the Department of Justice. The government has no statutory right to
intervene nor does it have a right to limit the participation
of the relator. The government does not have the right to
stay discovery which may interfere with the government’s
criminal or civil investigations. The government may not
dismiss the action. Finally, the relator may settle the case
and bind the government without any involvement or approval by the Department of Justice.105
After the court vacated this decision to allow the government to intervene,
the Unique court stood by its previous decision and stated that even if Section 292 was considered a “civil-criminal hybrid,” it would still find the
statute unconstitutional under the Morrison test.106 The court further stated
that because the Federal Circuit had not yet “rejected the application of
Morrison to the False Marking Statute,” it had to “follow the Sixth Circuit’s
application of the Morrison analysis.”107
101. See, e.g., Rogers v. Tristar Prods., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d 711, 723-25 (E.D. Pa.
2011) (agreeing with Unique that the Morrison test does apply because Section 292’s qui
tam provision “represents the very delegation of criminal law enforcement authority that
Morrison’s test was designed to assess”).
102. Unique Prod. Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 997,
1004 (N.D. Ohio 2011), vacated as moot by Unique Prod. Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade
Valve, Inc., 462 F. App’x 967 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
103. Unique, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 1004 (referencing the Federal Circuit dicta in Solo
Cup that Section 292 was a criminal statute).
104. Id. at 1005.
105. Id.
106. Unique, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 858.
107. Id. at 848.
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Rogers followed the Unique court’s lead in finding that the FMA was
criminal, citing its amendment history,108 and further noted the FMA’s lack
of government controls in relation to the FCA.109 “The what, when, where,
and how of the litigation remain subject to the whims of whomever sees fit
to bring the suit. . . . And given the available financial penalties under [Bon
Tool], this lack of control is all the more troubling.”110
B.

MORRISON V. OLSON

It is with this background in mind that this Comment turns to the constitutionality of Section 292 before the America Invents Act. It is appropriate to first briefly look at Morrison and how the federal circuits have attempted to analyze the FCA111 in the same context. Then, we must decide
whether the Morrison test applies at all and to what degree.
1.

Applying Morrison

In Morrison, the Supreme Court assessed the constitutionality (under
Articles II and III of the Constitution) of Title VI of the Ethics in Government Act, which granted an independent counsel the authority to investigate
high-ranking officials for criminal acts.112 Because the attorney general
retained certain controls over the counsel’s prosecution, including removing
the counsel for good cause and initiating the investigation, and the counsel
had limited jurisdiction and certain policy constraints, the Court concluded
that the executive branch maintained “sufficient control over the independent counsel to ensure that the President is able to perform his constitutionally assigned duties.”113
The application of Morrison in circuit case law to the FCA is demonstrative of how an appellate court would analyze Section 292 under an Article II and III constitutional framework. For example, just a few years after
Morrison, without even mentioning the case, the Second Circuit found the
FCA’s qui tam provisions constitutional under Article III: “[T]he FCA qui
tam provisions do not usurp the executive branch’s litigating function be108. See Rogers v. Tristar Prods., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d 711, 717, 724-26 (E.D. Pa.
2011) (“The 1952 amendment made the statute a criminal one that could be enforced by
either the United States or by qui tam relators.”).
109. Id. at 724.
110. Id. at 724-25 (citation omitted).
111. The FCA (31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733) generally provides for qui tam relators to
file civil actions against persons and organizations that have filed fraudulent claims for payment from the federal government. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768-69 (2000).
112. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 660 (1988).
113. Id. at 696.
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cause the statute gives the executive branch substantial control over the
litigation.”114 That same year, the Ninth Circuit came across similar challenges to the FCA under Articles II and III, but the court did apply Morrison to find that “the FCA permits a degree of executive control sufficient to
satisfy the Morrison standard.”115 The court highlighted that “an independent counsel exercises broader investigative authority, prosecutorial discretion, and authority to use the resources of the U.S. Government than does a
qui tam relator.”116 It recognized that the FCA’s qui tam provision diminished the executive’s control over the claims to some degree but still maintained that this control was at least as equivalent as the government’s control over independent counsels.117
The Sixth Circuit in United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v.
General Electric Co., the case that the Unique court relied on in applying
Morrison, characterized qui tam statutes “as encouraging whistleblowers to
act as private attorneys-general . . . in pursuit of an important public policy.”118 In applying Morrison, the court went on to list the safeguards that
the FCA has in place to allow for sufficient government control over qui
tam claims.119
Several years later, the Fifth Circuit in Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal
Hospital120 addressed the issue in a slightly different manner. Before discussing Morrison, the court pointed out that the Take Care Clause “does not
require Congress to prescribe litigation by the Executive as the exclusive
means of enforcing federal law.”121 The court found that Morrison did not
apply to the FCA analysis because the independent counsel was granted
authority to act as the United States itself (as opposed to qui tam relators
who litigate in the name of the government) and qui tam plaintiffs were
“simply civil litigants” and not criminally prosecuting defendants.122 Although Riley did not discuss the FCA safeguards in depth, it did hint that
they might be sufficient to pass Morrison anyway: “Any intrusion by the
114. United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Tech. Corp., 985 F.2d
1148, 1155 (2d Cir. 1993).
115. United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 751-52 (9th Cir. 1993).
116. Id. at 752-53.
117. Id. at 754-55.
118. United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Gen. Electric Co., 41 F.3d
1032, 1041-42 (6th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations marks omitted).
119. Id. at 1041. These FCA safeguards included the government’s ability to “require
the relator to inform it of developments” in the litigation, “intervene later upon a showing of
good cause,” and “move to have the relator’s litigation role significantly restricted”; the
statute also requires “the relator’s filings to be sealed for at least sixty days, and for much
longer if the government can show the need.” Id.
120. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, 252 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001).
121. Id. at 753.
122. Id. at 754-55.
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qui tam relator in the executive’s Article II power is comparatively modest,
especially given the control mechanisms inherent in the FCA to mitigate
such an intrusion . . . .”123
The Tenth Circuit subsequently agreed with the FCA analysis from the
Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits when it held “that at least where the Government intervenes, the qui tam provisions of the FCA do not violate the
separation of powers by transgression of the Take Care Clause.”124
In the middle of this FCA litigation by qui tam plaintiffs in the circuit
courts, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Vermont Agency of
Natural Resources that affirmed that the circuits were on the right track
regarding the FCA.125 In that case, the Court, using the long history and
importance of qui tam statutes through American and English history and
the fact that these plaintiff relators were assignees of government claims,
found that the FCA’s qui tam provision was constitutional under Article
III.126 Although the Court expressed no opinion regarding the FCA’s constitutionality under Article II, there is evidence that the result would be similar.127
2.

Section 292(b) Is a Criminal-Civil Hybrid Statute at Best

The primary reason that the Rogers and Unique courts found Section
292 unconstitutional and applied Morrison is because they found the FMA
to be a criminal statute.128 This conclusion, however, is contrary to the
123. Id. at 757.
124. United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 265 F.3d 1157, 1176 (10th
Cir. 2001); see also Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co., 397 F.3d 925, 934-35 (10th Cir. 2005)
(reaffirming the reasoning in Stone).
125. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765,
787-88 (2000) (“We hold that a private individual has standing to bring suit in federal court
on behalf of the United States under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733, but that
the False Claims Act does not subject a State (or state agency) to liability in such actions.”).
126. Id. at 777-78.
127. Id. at 778 n.8 (“In so concluding, we express no view on the question whether
qui tam suits violate Article II, in particular the Appointments Clause of § 2 and the ‘Take
Care’ Clause of § 3.”).
128. Unique Prod. Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 997,
1003 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (“Thus, as the False Marking Statute is criminal, the Court is bound
by Morrison and its ‘sufficient control’ analysis . . . .”), vacated as moot by Unique Prod.
Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc., 462 F. App’x 967 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Rogers v.
Tristar Prods., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d 711, 723 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“[T]he Court agrees with
the Unique court that section 292(b) represents the very delegation of criminal law enforcement authority that Morrison’s test was designed to assess.”). But see the Unique court’s
opinion reaffirming the dismissal: “even if the False Marking Statute is considered to be
civil or a civil-criminal hybrid governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court
would still find the statute unconstitutional under the Morrison sufficient control analysis.”
Unique Prod. Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 2d 854, 858 (N.D. Ohio
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weight of authority129 and is not necessarily supported by the sources that
these two courts cite. Although Section 292, as Professor Elizabeth Winston
stated, “is the closest statute to a criminal section found in patent law,” 130
courts looking at both this section and the FCA have characterized qui tam
plaintiffs under these provisions as merely “civil litigants” filing civil actions.131 Three compelling arguments arise that support the contention that
Section 292 is not completely criminal in nature.
First, and most convincing, the burden of proof needed for proving the
elements of a false marking claim is too low to be criminal. The Federal
Circuit in Solo Cup reaffirmed the circuit’s practice since Clontech that “the
burden of proof of intent for false marking is a preponderance of the evidence.”132 This is completely inconsistent with the higher burden of proof,
however, necessary for criminal prosecution. The Supreme Court has held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects an accused “against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt,”
and this indispensible principle is rooted in our national history, the history
of Supreme Court precedent, and the “American scheme of criminal procedure.”133 The necessity of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt for criminal liability has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court, as it is also crucial to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
rights.134 Specifically, using this lower burden also would violate a defend-

2011), vacated as moot by Unique Prod. Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc., 462 F.
App’x 967 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
129. See, e.g., Simonian v. Allergan, Inc., No. 10 C02414, 2011 WL 1599292, at
*444 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2011) (“Unique Product Solutions, Ltd. is contrary to the overwhelming weight of case law, which holds that Section 292(b) is constitutional.”).
130. Elizabeth I. Winston, The Flawed Nature of the False Marking Act, 77 TENN. L.
REV. 111, 121 (2009).
131. See, e.g., Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749, 755 (5th Cir. 2001)
(“[R]elators are simply civil litigants.”); Luka v. Procter & Gamble Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d
712, 719-20 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (agreeing with Riley that qui tam relators are “simply civil
litigants” (quoting Riley, 252 F.3d at 755)); Simonian, 2011 WL 1599292, at *4 (“[T]he
direct-control test espoused by the Supreme Court in Morrison does not apply to the same
degree in this setting, which involves a civil action . . . .”).
132. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
133. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-65 (1970).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 230 (2005) (“It has been settled throughout our history that the Constitution protects every criminal defendant ‘against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.’” (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364)); Pepper
v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1241 (2011) (citing Booker when discussing “the Sixth
Amendment right of criminal defendants to be tried by a jury and to have every element of
an offense proved by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt”).
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ant’s Fifth Amendment Due Process rights.135 Courts cannot claim the FMA
is criminal and then apply this low burden of proof for essentially a criminal prosecution;136 they cannot have it both ways.
Second, if the FMA is purely criminal, courts have been using the
wrong procedural rules for years.137 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as opposed to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, would then have
to be followed, and courts are bound to use them appropriately.138 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure afford criminal defendants specific procedural rights, some of which are not found in the Rules of Civil Procedure,139
in order to be consistent with a defendant’s constitutional protections.140
This again runs afoul of a defendant’s procedural Due Process rights.141 The
Luka court summed up this peculiarity quite nicely:
In this Court’s view, the fact that Section 292 is a criminal
statute does not make a qui tam suit under section 292(b)
“a criminal action.” Indeed, if it was, the Rules of Civil
Procedure would not even apply—including Rule 9(b),
which the Federal Circuit specifically held in BP Lubricants USA applies in false marking cases.142
Third, just because the statute is penal in nature does not make the
FMA a criminal act. Several courts, including the Federal Circuit, have
135. See Caroline Ayres Teichner, Note, Markedly Low: An Argument to Raise the
Burden of Proof for Patent False Marking, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1389, 1416 (2011) (setting
forth a compelling argument to raise the burden of proof in false marking cases).
136. See Luka, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 721 n.5 (“If a false marking case were truly a
‘criminal action,’ as the court in Unique Product Solutions stated, the burden of proof would
not be the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard that the Federal Circuit has held applies.”).
137. See id. (“Indeed, if it was, the Rules of Civil Procedure would not even apply . .
. .”); see also Grant, supra note 21, at 301-02.
138. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 66 (1991) (“Like the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are as binding as any
statute duly enacted by Congress, and federal courts have no more discretion to disregard the
Rule[s’] mandate than they do to disregard constitutional or statutory provisions.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Dela Rosa, 495 F.2d 253, 256 (9th Cir. 1974)
(providing some examples of express rights given to criminal defendants in the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, such as the “defendant’s right to be present at the time of sentencing” and “to speak on his own behalf”).
140. See Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 632 (1988) (recognizing that
there is a “fundamental proposition that criminal penalties may not be imposed on someone
who has not been afforded the protections that the Constitution requires of such criminal
proceedings, including the requirement that the offense be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt”).
141. Teichner, supra note 135, at 1415-16.
142. Luka, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 721.
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characterized the FMA as “penal” in nature,143 but the Federal Circuit has
also recognized that Section 292 imposes a “civil fine” on violators and is
“civil in nature.”144 As Professor Winston points out, “the mere fact that a
statute authorizes monetary damages does not imply that the statute is penal. For example, violation of the Lanham Act can result in monetary damages, and it is not penal.”145
For example, the court in Sippit Cups, Inc. v. Michael’s Creations,
Inc. discussed this very issue shortly after Section 292 was amended and
concluded “that there is a clear distinction between the word ‘penal’ as so
used, and the word ‘criminal.’”146 The Sippit court, agreeing with the rationale of a Supreme Court opinion from 1892, found that Section 292 was
not a “criminal cause” because it allowed for a private action that gave a
civil remedy.147
Further, what little legislative history there is regarding the 1952
amendments to Section 292 does not clear up the issue.148 The Senate report
states that these amendments made Section 292 “an ordinary criminal action as well as an informer action as in the present statute.”149 The Unique
and the Rogers courts especially relied on this language in concluding that
Section 292 was criminal.150 On the other hand, Solo Cup, for example,
used the exact same language to find that the statute was still primarily civil

143. E.g., Proportion-Air, Inc. v. Buzmatics, Inc., No. 94-1426, 1995 U.S. App.
LEXIS 25871, at *7 (Fed. Cir. June 14, 1995) (“[T]he false marking statute is penal in nature
and must be strictly construed . . . .”); Brose v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 455 F.2d 763, 765
(5th Cir. 1972) (“Brose’s failure to prove any one of the above elements would have proved
fatal to his cause since the [FMA] is penal in nature and must be strictly construed.”);
Filmon Process Corp. v. Spell-Right Corp., 404 F.2d 1351, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“We are
in agreement with the judicial pronouncements that 35 U.S.C. § 292(b), while penal, is not a
criminal statute.”).
144. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he false
marking statute [Section 292] is a criminal one, despite being punishable only with a civil
fine. . . . A qui tam action is civil in form, even though it arises under a criminal statute.”).
145. Grant, supra note 21, at 302.
146. Sippit Cups, Inc. v. Michael’s Creations, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 58, 61 (E.D.N.Y.
1960).
147. Id. The Supreme Court case was Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 665 (1892)
(“But laws which, while imposing a duty, at the same time confer a right upon the citizens to
claim damages for its nonperformance, are not criminal.”).
148. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 22 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2424
(“This is a criminal provision.”).
149. Id. at 2403.
150. Unique Prod. Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 997,
1004 (N.D. Ohio 2011), vacated as moot by Unique Prod. Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade
Valve, Inc., 462 F. App’x 967 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Rogers v. Tristar Prods., Inc., 793 F. Supp.
2d 711, 717 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
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in nature.151 A number of criteria that the Supreme Court has set forth in
two separate cases point to Section 292 being criminal as well,152 but this
conclusion is countered by the fact that civil actions are filed by private
plaintiffs and not the government.153
A very recent case, Hollander v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Inc.,154 illustrated the problem by relying on the language of congressional reports and
committee notes regarding Section 292, especially when construing and
defining the word “fine”:
A “fine” relates to a “pecuniary punishment or civil penalty
payable to the public treasury,” and a civil penalty is a type
of fine assessed for violation of a statute or regulation. Further, many courts use the terms civil penalty and fine interchangeably. Thus, use of the term “fine” does not necessarily mean a statute is criminal.155
The confusion over the nature of Section 292 and even congressional
language has been troubling courts since the 1952 amendment.156 Even the
Unique court stated that the statute resembled a “civil-criminal hybrid.”157
Another commentator, who found that Section 292 was primarily criminal,
also conceded that “[p]erhaps the best solution is to classify § 292 as a quasi-criminal provision, given its hybrid nature.”158 Then again, looking at
what is needed constitutionally to be considered a criminal statute, it appears that Section 292, when it maintained a qui tam provision with a civil
penalty, did not invoke “the executive’s core function of criminal prosecu151. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714, 727 n.17 (E.D. Va. 2009)
(“This interpretation is consistent with a 1952 Senate Report stating that the statute is ‘an
ordinary criminal action as well as an informer action.’”).
152. A two-factor test was laid out in United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49
(1980) (finding that the nature of the statute is “a matter of statutory construction”). A more
extensive test was outlined in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)
(discussing the criminal nature of the Nationality Act of 1940 and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952). But a comprehensive application of these factors to the FMA is beyond the scope of this Comment.
153. Teichner, supra note 135, at 1414.
154. Hollander v. Ranbaxy Labs. Inc., 804 F. Supp. 2d 344, 355 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“I
am unwilling to give Morrison much weight in determining whether § 292(b) is constitutional.”).
155. Id. at 348 n.7 (citations omitted) (referencing Black’s Law Dictionary).
156. Compare, e.g., Huston v. Buckeye Bait Corp., 145 F. Supp. 600 (S.D. Ohio
1955) (finding the section criminal), with Trabon Eng’g Co. v. Eaton Mfg. Co., 37 F.R.D. 51
(N.D. Ohio 1964) (finding the section civil in nature).
157. Unique Prod. Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 2d 854, 858
(N.D. Ohio 2011), vacated as moot by Unique Prod. Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc.,
462 F. App’x 967 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
158. Teichner, supra note 135, at 1414.
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tion,”159 or at least not to the extent that the statute in Morrison did. Reiterating the Luka court’s statement, “[i]t is commonplace for federal statutes,
even criminal statutes, to contain civil enforcement mechanisms that permit
private parties to sue to enforce statutory prohibitions.”160 Does this mean
that all “informer actions” could be subject to the constitutional ax?161
3.

Section 292 Did Provide Sufficient Safeguards for Proper Executive
Control

Several courts have already pointed out that when applying Morrison
to somewhat of a lesser degree, Section 292 yielded sufficient executive
safeguards.162 Through various measures, the government has three main
outlets for this control: notice of the suit, a right to intervene, and a right to
control the litigation to an extent when admitted into the suit.
First, the executive branch, through the Patent and Trademark Office,
is made aware of Section 292 suits because all patent suits under Title 35
are required to be reported to them by law.163 The mandate of 35 U.S.C. §
290 is that notice must be given within one month of the filing of the suit
along with “the names and addresses of the parties, the name of the inventor, and the designating number of the patent upon which the relator has
brought the action.”164 However, as the Unique court pointed out, this notice is given only to the Patent Office (not the Department of Justice) and is
not required to include the statute under which the claim is filed.165 This is
not to say that the government is likely to ignore the suit or necessarily less
likely to intervene to protect its interests.166 Considering that Section 292
159. Hy Cite Corp. v. Regal Ware, Inc., No. 10-cv-168-wmc, 2011 WL 1206768, at
*4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 15, 2011).
160. Luka v. Procter & Gamble Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 712, 719 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
161. Informer actions are a common tool in statutory enforcement. For just one example, see 26 U.S.C. § 7623 regarding the incentives for whistleblowers (“informers”) exposing tax fraud.
162. See, e.g., Regal, 2011 WL 1206768, at *5 (“[T]he United States’ government
retains the authority and ability to exercise involvement and control over this § 292 qui tam
lawsuit if needed.”).
163. Simonian v. Allergan, Inc., No. 10-2414, 2011 WL 1599292, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 28, 2011) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 290).
164. Id.
165. Unique Prod. Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 997,
1004-05 (N.D. Ohio 2011), vacated as moot by Unique Prod. Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade
Valve, Inc., 462 F. App’x 967 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
166. See Luka, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 721 (“And if the government, having received
notice, chooses not to intervene (as is frequently the case in False Claims Act qui tam suits),
one may fairly infer that the executive itself sees no need to do so and thus perceives no
impingement on the exercise of its law enforcement authority.”). This is further illustrated
by the substantial amount of false marking cases that the government has intervened in,
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was one of only three active qui tam statutes167 (the only one concerning
patents), how much of a burden would it be for a clerk in the patent office
to add the section under which it was filed?
Second, the government has options to enter into a qui tam lawsuit under the FMA in order to overlook the action.168 Other sections, like 28
U.S.C. §§ 517 and 518, allow for the government to send officers to lawsuits and appealed claims that involve an interest of the United States.169
The government also has the right to intervene in such actions pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 (and 5.1(c) for constitutional issues), a
right that a court has to give in Section 292 cases, according to the Federal
Circuit.170
The Unique court argued that notice and this possibility of intervention
could come too late and bind the government to an unwanted settlement,
citing the abundant intervention protections of the FCA that Section 292
lacked.171 One should be careful in comparing the FMA to the FCA in this
respect, however, as it is composed very differently and is protecting
somewhat of a different governmental interest.172 Whereas the government
may have an interest in enforcing its laws and preventing harm of false
marking on the public, the government arguably has a greater interest in
FCA litigation because these claims involve fraud against the government.173
Third, if the government does intervene in a false marking action, it
can bar a plaintiff (relator or not) from dropping the case without their volmany of which did not include a constitutional issue. See, e.g., Stauffer v. Brooks Bros. Inc.,
619 F.3d 1321, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (deciding a case where the government attempted to
intervene in a Section 292 action when no constitutional issue was at hand).
167. DOYLE, supra note 32, at 1.
168. See, e.g., Simonian, 2011 WL 1599292, at *5 (“[T]he government maintains a
sufficient level of control over qui tam actions brought under Section 292(b).”).
169. Hollander v. Ranbaxy Labs. Inc., 804 F. Supp. 2d 344, 352 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
170. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714, 727 (E.D. Va. 2009) (“The
United States may intervene in a qui tam action, either as of right, see FED. R. CIV. P.
24(a)(2), or with a court's permission, see FED R. CIV. P. 24(b).”); Stauffer, 619 F.3d at 1328
(“[T]he government has an interest in enforcement of its laws and in one half the fine that
Stauffer claims, disposing of the action would as a practical matter impair or impede the
[government’s] ability to protect its interest, and Stauffer may not adequately represent that
interest.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
171. Unique, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 1005.
172. See Hollander, 804 F. Supp. 2d 344, 355 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“[Section] 292 also
differs from the False Claims Act, which creates a standalone [sic] civil action with a separately codified criminal companion.”).
173. The FCA’s purpose, unlike Section 292, was to allow for claims to redress fraud
committed against the government. See generally Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and the
False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273 (1992).
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untary consent under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).174
This right is furthered by rule 26(c) of the FRCP, which allows the United
States to apply for a protective order if the plaintiff’s actions interfere with
its prosecution or investigation into the matter.175 When one combines these
procedures, it appears that the government does retain a fair amount of control over Section 292 proceedings.176
Further, it must be understood that the reason why the FCA currently
contains more stringent government control options has nothing to do with
an attempt to stay within the bounds of Article II. Congress amended the
FCA in 1943 after United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,177 when there was a
clear indication of abuse of the FCA’s qui tam provisions.178 These
amendments essentially increased the notice requirements of the statute to
inform the government of qui tam actions in addition toincreasing the options for government intervention.179
4.

The Federal Circuit and Supreme Court Have Hinted that Section 292
Is Constitutional

In one recent case, the Federal Circuit refused to address the constitutionality of the FMA sua sponte because the parties did not raise or argue
the issue on appeal.180 For at least one court, this action was presumed to
indicate that the Federal Circuit indirectly accepted the FMA’s constitutional validity.181 As the Ninth and Tenth Circuits stated when assessing the
FCA’s constitutionality, federal courts are supposed to “interpret statutes in
174. See, e.g., Solo Cup, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 727-28 (“If the United States intervenes
and the qui tam relator attempts to voluntarily dismiss the case, it cannot do so without a
court order if the United States does not consent.”).
175. Id. at 728.
176. See, e.g., Luka v. Procter & Gamble Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 712, 720-22 (N.D. Ill.
2011) (finding that Section 292 did retain sufficient safeguards and the FCA’s strict safeguards were not needed).
177. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943) (considering whether
a qui tam plaintiff can also recover from an FCA claim when the defendant had already been
indicted for the same offense, which originally informed the qui tam plaintiff of the fraudulent conduct).
178. J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam
Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 556 (2000).
179. Id. at 560.
180. Stauffer v. Brooks Bros. Inc., 619 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[W]e will
not decide its constitutionality without the issue having been raised or argued by the parties.”).
181. E.g., Zojo Solutions, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 712 F. Supp. 2d 756, 758 (N.D. Ill.
2010) (“[The Federal Circuit’s] failure to speak of any potential problem of unconstitutionality could be viewed as confirming the validity of the statute. In any event, this Court will
leave that task to the Federal Circuit if this action gives rise to an appeal.”).

2012]

PA-‘TROLLING’ THE FALSE MARKING FRONTIER

215

a manner that renders them constitutionally valid”182 and “should invalidate
an act of Congress only ‘for the most compelling constitutional reasons.’”183 Considering the Federal Circuit is merely an appellate court,184 it
is likely that it would have not only followed this precedent but would have
taken the view that these constitutional issues “are more appropriately
voiced to Congress [as] the proper forum to effect the changes” that defendant manufacturers seek.185
The long history of such qui tam claims, recently discussed in Vermont
Agency of Natural Resources, and their congressional purpose signal that
the Federal Circuit may be reluctant to find Section 292 unconstitutional.186
As the court in Hollander said, “[t]he social value of the qui tam mechanism has been proven over and over again, and it is not necessary . . . for a .
. . court to upset and declare unconstitutional such a long-existing and wellworking mechanism that Congress has approved and has not changed.”187
As Professor Evan Caminker wrote years ago when he was clerking for
Justice William Brennan and discussing the constitutionality of qui tam
provisions, “qui tam actions have been authorized by Congress and adjudicated by courts for over two hundred years in this country.”188 He continued, stating that “Congress may also ultimately determine relative enforcement levels of statutes more indirectly by supplementing executive efforts
with citizens’ suits, and qui tam suits pose no greater constraint on executive discretion to determine the relative importance of enforcing specific
statutes than does the more conventional mode of dual enforcement.”189 It is
unlikely that the Federal Circuit would have disturbed this long-standing
practice under all the circumstances.190
Over the last few terms, the Federal Circuit has been given less deference on patent issues and has been finding itself reviewed more frequently
182. Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co., 397 F.3d 925, 934 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001)).
183. United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 384 (1989)).
184. Gregory A. Castanias et al., 2010 Patent Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit:
“The Advent of the Radar Court,” 60 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 849 (2011).
185. Hollander v. Ranbaxy Labs. Inc., 804 F. Supp. 2d 344, 355-56 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
186. See Ford v. Hubbell, Inc., No. 10 CV 513, 2011 WL 1259707, at *3 (S.D. Ill.
Mar. 28, 2011) (“This Court believes that if and when the Federal Circuit does address the
issue, it will find the statute constitutional.”).
187. Hollander, 804 F. Supp. 2d at 355.
188. Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341,
357 (1989).
189. Id. at 360. Professor Caminker states later in the paper that “self-selection of
litigants does not in any significant sense hamper the executive’s ability to ‘take Care’ that
congressional goals are fulfilled through execution of the law; indeed, self-selection is designed specifically to ensure fulfillment of congressionally defined objectives.” Id. at 377.
190. See Ford, 2011 WL 1259707, at *3.
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by the Supreme Court.191 Over the last ten years Supreme Court review
typically meant a reversal of the circuit’s decision, but over the last term it
has meant the exact opposite.192 This tends to show that if the Federal Circuit did issue a constitutional decision regarding Section 292, there is a
good chance that it would be reviewed by the Supreme Court, especially
with a matter related to the decision in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources.193
Although a majority of the Court in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources stated that they would not address the issue regarding qui tam relators and Article II, there is still an indication as to how they would rule on
the issue.194 From the opinion itself, it is undisputed that the Court recognizes the long history of qui tam statutes in the United States, congressional
authority to pass qui tam statutes, and the purpose of qui tam provisions.195
Justice John Paul Stevens and Justice David Souter in their dissent found
that this evidence was enough for the Court to resolve, and presumably find
constitutional, the Article II question.196 As a matter of fact, a couple of
courts found the Justices’ statements persuasive as to the constitutionality
of Section 292.197 The district court in Solo Cup summed up this argument
nicely: “It is unlikely that the framers would have written a Constitution
that outlawed this practice, and then immediately passed several qui tam
laws that unconstitutionally encroached on Executive Branch power before
the ink on the Constitution was even dry.”198

191. Castanias et al., supra note 184, at 849-50.
192. Steven Seidenber, A Comeback for the Federal Circuit: This Term, the Supreme
Court is No Longer the ‘Court of Correction,’ A.B.A. J., Sept. 2011, at 17, 17, available at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/A_comeback_for_the_federal_circuit_this_ter
m_supreme_court_is_no_longer/.
193. See id.
194. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 778
n.8 (2000) (“[W]e express no view on the question whether qui tam suits violate Article II,
in particular the Appointments Clause of § 2 and the ‘take Care’ Clause of § 3.”).
195. Id. at 776-78.
196. Id. at 801 (Stevens and Souter, JJ., dissenting) (“That evidence, together with
the evidence that private prosecutions were commonplace in the 19th century is also sufficient to resolve the Article II question . . . .” (citation omitted)).
197. Hy Cite Corp. v. Regal Ware, Inc., No. 10-cv-168-wmc, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
65978, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 15, 2011); Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714,
726 (E.D. Va. 2009).
198. Solo Cup, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 726.
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The Constitutional Fight May Not Be Over

Although Congress just amended Section 292 with the America Invents Act, and it was subsequently signed,199 these constitutional issues
may still surface in the coming years under the amended FMA. For example, defendants may still challenge the constitutionality of Section 292’s
civil enforcement mechanism, even though it requires a competitive injury
by a plaintiff, arguing that its burden of proof and court procedural rules
deny them Due Process rights because the statute is criminal in nature.200
Although unsuccessful, several plaintiffs have already tried a similar route,
claiming that the new amendments are unconstitutional under the Due Process and Takings Clauses.201 As at least one commentator on the subject
explained, many current plaintiffs may plead and argue that they are competitively harmed as researchers, future competitors, or as a member of the
general public.202
Recently, the Federal Circuit dismissed United States ex rel. FLFMC,
LLC v. Wham-O, and Unique Product Solutions, Ltd. based on the parties’
agreement that the appeal and standing issue were moot.203 Ultimately, the
199. Press Release, U.S. Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama Signs America
Invents Act, Overhauling the Patent System to Stimulate Economic Growth, and Announces
New Steps to Help Entrepreneurs Create Jobs (Sept. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/president-obama-signs-americainvents-act-overhauling-patent-system-stim [hereinafter Obama Press Release].
200. See Teichner, supra note 135, at 1412-20.
201. See Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc. v. Cabela’s Inc., No. 09–CV–102
H(WMC), 2011 WL 6400630, at *2, *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2011) (rejecting both constitutional arguments and further asserting that the relator did not plead a competitive injury);
Brooks v. Dunlop Mfg. Inc., No. C 10–04341 CRB, 2011 WL 6140912, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 9, 2011) (rejecting similar constitutional arguments by a qui tam plaintiff because the
government had, “by eliminating the qui tam provision in § 292, rationally furthered a legitimate legislative purpose by comprehensively reducing the costs and inefficiencies associated with the ‘cottage industry’ of false marking litigation,” and the plaintiff did not have a
vested property interest in the false marking claim); Rogers v. Conair Corp., No. 10-1497,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58110, at *9-10, *12-13 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2012) (rejecting a Due
Process challenge because “Congress passed the Amendment pursuant to a legitimate legislative purpose” of quelling expensive qui tam litigation and rejecting a Takings Clause challenge because qui tam litigants as members of the general public had no vested property
interest in the litigation until judgment). At the time of the submission of this article, the
plaintiff’s appeal in the Brooks case was still pending in the Federal Circuit. Brooks v. Dunlop Mfg. Inc., No. C 10–04341 CRB, 2011 WL 6140912 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011), appeal
docketed, No. 2012-1164 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 19, 2012).
202. Granaghan, supra note 30, at 496-97. This is unlikely now in wake of the more
recent decisions cited in the previous footnote.
203. United States ex rel. FLFMC, LLC v. Wham-O, Inc., No.01-CV-2435, 2011
U.S. App. LEXIS 21224, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 19, 2011); Unique Prod. Solutions, Ltd. v. HyGrade Valve, Inc., 462 F. App’x 967 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The Federal Circuit also dismissed at
least one other similar appeal after the America Invents Act was passed. Rogers v. Tristar
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court never touched the constitutional issues regarding both the former and
the newly amended FMA.204 Further, if Congress does amend Section 292
in the future to require a mere “injury” to have standing205 or reinstate the
qui tam provision, this constitutional analysis would still apply. Keep in
mind that some false marking claims could still be pending and there is no
telling what plaintiffs and defendants will do to continue or dismiss these
claims.206
IV.
A.

THE AMERICAN INVENTS ACT AND ITS SECTION 292 AMENDMENTS
PREVIOUS LEGISLATION

Several changes to the FMA were proposed in the last couple years but
none were passed successfully.207 Most of these amendments were a reaction to the rulings of the Federal Circuit and the rise of false marking
trolls.208 Senator Patrick Leahy introduced one of the first amendments via
the Patent Reform Act of 2009 (S. 515), which limited plaintiffs under Section 292(b) who suffered a competitive injury to receiving compensatory
damages.209 Both the House and Senate the following year continued recommending changes to the FMA, with H.R. 4954, H.R. 6352,210 and
Prods., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d 711 (E.D. Pa. 2011), vacated as moot by Nos. 2011–1494,
2011–149, 449 Fed. Appx. 921 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2011), motion for reconsideration denied
by Nos. 2011–1494, 2011–1495, 2012 WL 1660604 (Fed. Cir. May 2, 2012) (rejecting a qui
tam plaintiff’s arguments that the retroactive application of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act’s “competitive injury” requirement violated the Fifth Amendment).
204. Wham-O, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 21224, at *4 n.1; see also Rydstrom et al.,
supra note 8, at 18 (“Although the enactment of any amendment would have a drastic effect
on Section 292 actions, legislative action could discourage the Federal Circuit from deciding
the matter.”).
205. See infra Part V.A.2.
206. See generally Gray, supra note 57.
207. See, e.g., Joshua M. Dalton & Lawrence T. Stanley Jr., The New Normal: How
Recent Decisions Will Change Our Daily Practices, in THE IMPACT OF RECENT PATENT LAW
CASES AND DEVELOPMENTS: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING CHANGING LEGAL
STANDARDS, ANALYZING HIGH-PROFILE DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPING NEW CLIENT
STRATEGIES 15 (2011) (“Of course, there has been a ‘patent reform act’ of some kind before
Congress each year for several years, none of which has passed.”).
208. See, e.g., Phong D. Nguyen, A Survey of Patent Law in Cyberspace, 66 BUS.
LAW. 197, 200 (2010).
209. Thomas J. Daly & Daniel R. Kimbell, Bad Marks: A Recent Federal Circuit
Decision Has Greatly Raised the Stakes in False Patent Marking Litigation, 34 L.A. LAW.,
July/Aug. 2011, at 30, 33, available at http://www.lacba.org/Files/LAL/Vol34No5/2833.pdf.
210. Beth Kublin, Comment, Reformation of the False Marking Statute Is Necessary;
Elimination of the Qui Tam Provision Is Not, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 69, 85 (2011). H.R. 6352
(The Patent Lawsuit Reform Act of 2010) was the precursor to H.R. 243, and their changes
to Section 292 were identical. Id.
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amendments to S. 515, again eliminating the qui tam provision by requiring
competitive injuries.211
The push for an amendment continued in 2011 in the House with the
Patent Lawsuit Reform Act of 2011 (H.R. 243) and the Patent Continuing
Disclosure Act (H.R. 1056).212 The Patent Lawsuit Reform Act would have
also limited such actions to those who had suffered a competitive injury and
limited recovery to $500 in the aggregate.213 The Patent Continuing Disclosure Act, instead of requiring a competitive injury, granted certain exceptions to expired patents and allowed for manufacturers to inform the public
and competitors that the patent had expired.214 None of these attempts were
successful.
B.

THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT

On March 8, 2011, the Senate passed S. 23, the Senate version of the
American Invents Act, and the legislation looked promising in the Spring of
2011.215 Essentially, the bill would have limited a cause of action for $500
penalties under Section 292(a) to the United States, and it again would have
only allowed competitors to sue for compensable damages rather than the
full $500 penalty.216 After the Senate passed S. 23, the House version of the
bill, H.R. 1249, was introduced and passed on June 23, 2011.217 As commentators highlighted, this bill makes similar changes to Section 292,218 but
as this Comment will demonstrate, this bill does so much more (good and
bad). H.R. 1249 passed without amendment by the Senate on September 8
and was signed by President Barack Obama on September 16, 2011.219
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act sets forth a number of changes
to Section 292, and this section will analyze them in relation to the original
purpose of the FMA by breaking up the discussion into five parts. First, this
211. See Richard D. Milone & S. Mahmood Ahmad, False Patent Marking Litigation: The Present Landscape and Mitigating Its Risks, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS. (June
2010),
http://www.kelleydrye.com/publications/articles/1369/_res/id=Files/index=0/False%20Paten
t%20Marketing%20Litigation%20The%20Present%20Landscape%20And%20Mitigating%2
0Its%20Risks.pdf; Kelsey I. Nix & Laurie N. Stempler, Federal Circuit Ignites Interest in
False Patent Marking Lawsuits, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., 35 (October 2010),
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2010/October/35.pdf.
212. Rydstrom et al., supra note 8, at 16-17.
213. John Deming, The Current False Patent Marking Landscape, IP
MONETIZATION, May 2011, at 197, 209.
214. Rydstrom et al., supra note 8, at 17-18.
215. See id. at 17.
216. Anania & Rodrigue, supra note 6, at 6.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Obama Press Release, supra note 199.
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section will underline concerns regarding the replacement of the qui tam
provision. It will then turn to the language of the America Invents Act that
effectively changes the Federal Circuit’s definition and application of “unpatented article.”220 Next, it will discuss the limitation of damages available
to plaintiffs under the new law. Then the section will take a look at the provisions of the America Invents Act that allow for virtual marking. Finally,
in analyzing the effective date of the America Invents Act, the section will
conclude with the application of these changes to pending false marking
cases.
1.

Replacing the Qui Tam Provision

After the amendments, Section 292(b) reads: “A person who has suffered a competitive injury as a result of a violation of this section may file a
civil action in a district court of the United States for recovery of damages
adequate to compensate for the injury.”221 As is clear, this language differs
substantially from the “any person” language of the previous text and effectively eliminates the qui tam provision. Consequently, this change may hinder the effectiveness of the FMA, as there were clear reasons why the qui
tam provision was in place.222
Qui tam provisions, as the Supreme Court found in Vermont Agency of
Natural Resources and the Federal Circuit stated in Stauffer, “allow individuals to stand in the government’s stead, as assignees of the government’s
own claims.”223 Their adoption has been rooted in the American and English legal tradition, and historically, Congress has had the power to proscribe their application to enforce legislation.224 As the Federal Circuit noted in Bon Tool, “Congress’ interest in preventing false marking was so
great that it enacted a statute, which sought to encourage third parties to
bring qui tam suits to enforce the statute.”225 Members of the general public
220. See Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (“[W]hen an unpatented article is marked with the word ‘patent’ or any word or number that imports that the article is patented, and such marking is for the purpose of deceiving
the public, the fine is invoked.”).
221. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 16(b)(2), 125 Stat.
284, 329 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 292).
222. See, e.g., Nichols v. Newell, 18 F. Cas. 199, 199-200 (C.C.D. Mass. 1853) (No.
10,245) (“To guard the public right to use such articles as have not been patented—to prevent deception on the public, by assertions that articles, not entitled to this privilege, have
been patented . . . [t]his being the purpose of the law . . . .”).
223. Stauffer v. Brooks Bros. Inc., 619 F.3d 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Vt. Agency
of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000).
224. Vt. Agency of Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 776-77; see generally Caminker, supra
note 188, at 354-59.
225. Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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could sue on behalf of the government in order to help control false marking.226
Qui tam provisions were originally initiated to fill a gap of the
“underenforcement of the law by local officials.”227 Qui tam actions were
also widely “seen as a way to promote efficient government use of resources.”228 These provisions were used to “enable the government to ‘enlist the aid of private individuals’ in its prosecution efforts by incentivizing
the latter with monetary awards, which thereby ‘alleviat[ed] the government’s need to pursue’ these actions alone.”229 As with the FCA, the
FMA’s qui tam provision also allowed for relators to introduce “private
knowledge of public harm,” which “can be both difficult and expensive for
the public [or the government] to obtain.”230
Just like the FCA, it is probably safe to say that an underlying reason
for the qui tam provision in Section 292 was the lack of government resources and inability to prosecute false marking cases.231 Eliminating the
provision under Section 292’s new amendments may not only do away with
the benefits of more possible plaintiffs and conservation of government
resources,232 it could also revert the statute back to its dormant position
prior to the Bon Tool decision.233 The judiciary saw a similar result with the
FCA; after Congress placed heavy restrictions on the FCA in 1943,234 overall claims significantly dropped the following decades.235 We must keep in
226. See id. at 1303-04.
227. Granaghan, supra note 30, at 489.
228. Craig Deutsch, Note, Restoring Truth: An Argument to Remove the Qui Tam
Provision from the False Marking Statute of the Patent Act, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 829,
833 (2010).
229. Teichner, supra note 135, at 1395 (internal quotation marks omitted).
230. Granaghan, supra note 30, at 489.
231. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 173, at 304 (“[T]his amendment would
encourage ‘private attorneys general’ who would help enforce the laws and protect the treasury by prosecuting wrongdoers that the government does not have the adequate resources to
pursue.”).
232. See Arneson, supra note 13, at 670 (“The increased number of potential plaintiffs decreases the burden on the government to enforce proper marking.”). Some experts
point out that the government may not have the resources to prosecute such marking claims
(hence the qui tam provision) and note that the government has never filed false marking
suits in the past. See Ryan Davis, Joyous Lawyers Bid Adieu to False Patent Marking Suits,
LAW360 (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.mayerbrown.com/news/article.asp?id=11569&nid=5.
233. Charnes & Hansen, supra note 19, at 1. To avoid this public injury and the flood
of false marking trolls, while still maintaining proper enforcement, one commentator has
actually proposed a persuasive argument to amend Section 292 to adopt a system that utilizes the principles of public nuisance actions. Richard A. Crudo, Note, A Patently Public
Concern: Using Public Nuisance Law to Fix the False Patent Marking Statute After the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 568 passim (2012).
234. Beck, supra note 178, at 560-61.
235. Teichner, supra note 135, at 1406-07.
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mind that the FMA tries to prevent deceiving the public, to protect the public’s right “to use such articles as have not been patented,”236 and to give
adequate notice to the public about a product’s patent rights.237 It is not farfetched to think that enforcing fraudulent marking may be best done by, of
course, the public.
2.

Eliminating Expired Patents from the “Unpatented Articles” List

The new amendments to Section 292 add a subsection (c) that reads:
“The marking of a product, in a manner described in subsection (a), with
matter relating to a patent that covered that product but has expired is not a
violation of this section.”238 This language clearly creates an exception for
expired patent numbers under Section 292, which is contrary to the Federal
Circuit’s ruling in Solo Cup.239 A few concerns arise here regarding the
original purpose of the FMA.
As the Federal Circuit pointed out in Solo Cup, and the Supreme Court
stated in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,240 “[a]n unpatentable article,
like an article on which the patent has expired, is in the public domain and
may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so.”241 The fact that unpatented articles are in the public domain opens up the possibility that the
public and competitors will be deceived of an article’s patent rights each
time that article is seen.242 Not only is the FMA designed to give notice to
the public of these rights, its purpose also rests on stimulating competition
in the product’s market, innovation and research, and avoiding the high cost
of designing around an unpatented article and checking the validity of the
patent.243 There is still the possibility, as explained below, that competitors
will be dissuaded from entering the market and that the public will be deceived.244 The Federal Circuit highlighted some of this problem when it
addressed the inherent costs and possible confusion in looking up expired
patents, considering that the patent number’s validity “depends on the date
it was filed[,] . . . whether there are patent term adjustments, and whether

236. Nichols v. Newell, 18 F. Cas. 199, 200 (C.C.D. Mass. 1853) (No. 10,245).
237. Id.
238. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 16(b)(3), 125 Stat.
284, 329 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 292).
239. See Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
240. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964).
241. See Solo Cup, 608 F.3d at 1361.
242. See Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(“The more articles that are falsely marked the greater the chance that competitors will see
the falsely marked article and be deterred from competing.”).
243. See id. at 1302-03.
244. See id.
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the particular patent owner has paid maintenance fees.”245 It seems logical
that “an article that is no longer protected by a patent is not ‘patented,’ . . .
[and] the public need not fear an infringement suit any more than if it were
never patented.”246
What also must be noted here is the absence of a date requirement in
Section 292 before and after the new amendments, unlike under the original
Act.247 Under the original provisions, the public was given the date that the
patent was issued and could easily figure out when it would expire, assuming an individual had knowledge of the United States’ patent term. 248 To
avoid this whole expired patent issue altogether, it may even be argued that
it is possible for manufacturers to put the dates of either issuance or expiration on these articles.249 In any case, expired patents still impose some cost
on the public because “the interested party must now research every patent
number marked, which harms the public notice function of the marking
without aiding the public in acquiring useful knowledge.”250 Adding an
exception for expired patents lets manufacturers continue to impose that
cost, while allowing them to mask a lack of current patent rights.251
3.

Damages Available Under the New Provisions

In addition to the language stated above offering only compensable
damages to competitors, the new changes also amend the end of subsection
(a) to read: “Only the United States may sue for the penalty authorized by
this subsection.”252 The combination of these changes dismantles the Federal Circuit’s decisions in both Stauffer and Bon Tool. Obviously, qui tam
plaintiffs will be barred from filing actions under the amendments, but

245. Solo Cup, 608 F.3d at 1362.
246. Id. at 1361.
247. See Winston, supra note 130, at 127 (“The original marking statute required
patentees to mark all goods with ‘the word “Patented” together with the day and year the
patent was granted.’”).
248. See id.
249. See id. at 128 (“It is neither difficult nor expensive to provide the information
about those patents that currently cover the innovation.”); see also Daly & Kimbell, supra
note 209, at 33 (“One option is to include expected expiration dates next to patent numbers.
A date gives clear notice that the patent is no longer in effect, and thereby thwarts an assertion of deceit.”).
250. Winston, supra note 130, at 127.
251. Daniel Ravicher, the executive director of the Public Patent Foundation, claims
that the new amendments “essentially allow[] companies to lie about which patents cover
their products and to say their products are covered by patents even if they aren’t.” See Davis, supra note 232.
252. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 16(b)(1), 125 Stat.
284, 329 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 292).
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some concerns also arise out of the limitation of compensable damages to
plaintiffs.253
Keep in mind, as stated above, that each time an article is falsely
marked in any way, it increases the chances that a competitor or member of
the public will see the marking, be negatively influenced by its existence,
and therefore suffer a legal harm.254 Not only does false marking injure
competitors, it also injures members of the general public,255 who could
have brought an action for such harm before the recent amendments.256 The
new amendments allow for compensation to a competitor but not the public,
unless an action is brought by the government in order to receive a per article fine from the manufacturer.257 Why is this a problem? If a competitor
brings a false marking action and recovers X amount of damages regarding
an injury to them and the government does not intervene, the government
will be subsequently barred from bringing another action for the same conduct for damages under subsection (a) on a per article basis via res judicata.258 Coupled with the qui tam provision elimination, limiting civil actions
to only injured competitors will limit the pool of plaintiffs (whose purpose
was to deter wrongful markings) who could file claims on behalf of the
government to address public harm.259 Even those scholars that advocate for
a compensatory system for recovery under the FMA, acknowledge that this
“social harm” should be considered when allocating compensatory damages.260
253. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 16(b)(2), 125
Stat. 284, 329 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 292) (“A person who has suffered a
competitive injury as a result of a violation of this section may file a civil action in a district
court of the United States for recovery of damages adequate to compensate for the injury.”
(emphasis added)).
254. See Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
255. See id. at 1302-03.
256. See 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) (2006) (“Any person may sue for the penalty . . . .”).
257. See § 16(b), 125 Stat. at 329.
258. Stauffer v. Brooks Bros. Inc., 619 F.3d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he
government would not be able to recover a fine from Brooks Brothers if Stauffer loses, as
res judicata would attach to claims against Brooks Brothers for the particular markings at
issue.”).
259. See Granaghan, supra note 30, at 490 (“The goal of the statute is less about
raising money than it is about deterring false marking and protecting the public from deception.”). Granaghan actually advocates for compensatory recovery under the FMA, lowering
the standard to negligence, and allowing for treble damages when purposeful intent is found.
Id. at 498.
260. Thomas F. Cotter, Optimal Fines for False Patent Marking, 17 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 181, 191 (2010) (“The minimum penalty that would serve this
purpose would be one that is precisely equal to the social harm/private gain, though perhaps
in some cases (for example, where the probability of detection and enforcement is less than
one) a multiplier might be necessary to achieve optimal deterrence.”).
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Further, eliminating per article recovery for civil litigants will likely
decrease the incentive for these litigants to file suit, even if they are injured
competitors.261 The Federal Circuit highlighted this point in Bon Tool, and
even stated that a “per decision” construction of the statute “would render
the statute completely ineffective.”262 This change may once again bring the
FMA back to its dormant stage prior to Bon Tool.263 Recall that this sort of
change initiated a dormant FCA after the 1943 amendments, which turned
around substantially after Congress expanded and restored the pool of potential plaintiffs again in 1986.264 Moreover, competitors will have to assess
the risk of filing an expensive false marking suit, considering there is little
indication now as to how compensatory damages would be calculated by a
court.265 Professor Thomas Cotter and common sense suggest that such an
injury would not be easily calculable.266
4.

A New Age of Virtual Marking?

The America Invents Act contains a significant amendment to Section
287(a) allowing for what is termed “virtual marking.”267 Essentially, it
261. See Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(“Penalizing false marking on a per decision basis would not provide sufficient financial
motivation for plaintiffs . . . to bring suit.”).
262. Id.; see also Steve Williams & Jane Du, Successfully Defending Against False
Marking Claims, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 10, 15 (2010), available at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njtip/v9/n1/2/Williams.pdf (“[A] single fine per
continuous act of false marking has little deterrent effect on the wrongdoer and would render
the statute ineffective.”); O’Neill, supra note 36, at 22 (“Thus, even those parties that suffered some actual injury as a result of a competitor’s false patent marking had little incentive
to file suit and incur the fees and costs associated with litigation. Those parties that suffered
no actual injury at all had no real incentive to sue.”).
263. Crudo, supra note 233, at 587 (“The consequence of the AIA will be similar to
the effect of the 1943 amendment to the False Claims Act (“FCA”) which reduced the award
that a plaintiff could recover under the statute.”); Davis, supra note 232 (highlighting practitioner’s arguments that the new amendments, especially those requiring a competitive injury
and limiting damages, will make it unattractive and difficult for anyone to bring false marking claims in the future).
264. Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 173, at 305 (discussing throughout the article
how financial incentives are key to the FCA’s purpose of whistle-blowing and the high
recoveries for the government but concluding that there are still fairly high costs associated
with the idea).
265. Cotter, supra note 260, at 188 n.29 (“Alternatively, if Congress were to enact
the Patent Reform Act proposal that courts award actual damages, courts would have to
struggle with the question of how to calculate those damages.”).
266. See id. These potential problems just touch the surface of the injury confusion.
See Granaghan, supra note 30, at 496-97, for a more comprehensive discussion on the problem of defining “competitive injury.”
267. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 16(a)(1), 125 Stat.
284, 328 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 292).
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gives an option to manufacturers to affix on an article the word “patent” or
“pat.” along with an internet address, accessible to the public, “that associates the patented article with the number of the patent.”268 The America
Invents Act further makes this change effective immediately and requires
the director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office to compile a
report within three years detailing the effectiveness of virtual marking (as
an alternative to physical marking) and any concerns that arise.269
Virtual marking was originally proposed by the 2009 Patent Reform
Bill, which contained an almost identical provision as that inserted into
Section 287(a) under the America Invents Act.270 This provision was incorporated into both the Senate and House versions of the currently enacted
legislation, and the director’s reporting procedure was later added into the
House version.271
In the wake of the qui tam troll problem and the recent holding of the
Federal Circuit finding that websites could also be considered expired articles (or patented articles to begin with) under Section 292,272 the stage may
be set for the incorporation of virtual marking, which could potentially be a
landmark change. Instead of physically printing patent numbers on products, virtual marking would allow for manufacturers to mark articles “with
a Uniform Resource Locator (URL), or web address” that “points to a website that lists the patent numbers” of the product.273 Considering that manufacturing is static and the equipment needed for printing is expensive, virtual marking offers a cheaper, quicker, and easier way to update patent numbers and other information.274

268. Id. Specifically the America Invents Act strikes the phrase “or when” in subsection (a) and replaces it with “or by fixing thereon the word ‘patent’ or the abbreviation ‘pat.’
together with an address of a posting on the Internet, accessible to the public without charge
for accessing the address, that associates the patented article with the number of the patent,
or when.” Id.
269. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 16(a)(2)-(3), 125 Stat.
284, 328-29 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 292).
270. See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4(e) (as reported by S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 2, 2009).
271. America Invents Act, S. 23, 112th Cong. § 4(b) (as passed by Senate, Mar. 8,
2011); America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 16(a) (as reported in the House on
Mar. 30, 2011).
272. Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Shipley, 643 F.3d 1346, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Because these policy concerns apply equally to websites as to traditional articles of manufacture or design, and because websites may both embody intellectual property and contain
identifying markings, this court holds that websites can qualify as unpatented articles within
the scope of § 292.”).
273. McCaffrey, supra note 23, at 376.
274. Id. at 369, 375-76 (“Virtual marking would enable patentees to change their
marks as quickly and easily as posting to a blog or sending an e-mail message.”).
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The use of virtual marking could also greatly increase the effectiveness and the original purpose of the FMA.275 It allows “patentees to convey
accurate and timely information to the public about pending patents, expired patents, and patents involved in litigation,” and provides a means to
give “notice to the public that a patent’s viability may temporarily be indeterminate,” so a manufacturer will not have to worry about the notice requirements of Section 287 or Section 292.276 Because manufacturers are not
required to put an expiration date on their products, virtual marking would
not only allow for manufacturers to avoid the risk of a patent’s expiration
and possible false marking liability (at least under the former Section 292),
but it would also provide an outlet to give the public notice of its expiration.277 This could be used to essentially clear up any loose ends or confusion regarding false marking and the public and present the possibility of a
manufacturer automatically updating such information regarding expiration.278
There remain problems with virtual marking, however, which probably should have been further addressed with additional language in the enacted legislation.279 For example, “patentees could abuse virtual marking by
marking with an unreasonable number of patents, keeping poor records of
historical changes to the marking site, failing to ensure that their site is
available, or violating the privacy of visitors to the site.”280 Some of these
problems and possible changes to Section 287’s new amendment will be
addressed further below, but virtual marking may still be a distant light at
the end of the tunnel for manufacturers.
5.

Pending False Marking Cases

The America Invents Act adds one more important provision to the
mix that makes a world of difference for both plaintiffs and defendants engaged in current litigation under the FMA“[t]he amendments made by this
subsection shall apply to all cases, without exception, that are pending on,

275. See id. at 389 (“If the product page continued to list the patents and clearly
noted that they had expired, then virtual marking would achieve the same public benefit that
the court identified without raising any concern as to whether it constituted a false mark.”).
276. See id. at 384, 393. This may have even been the intent of Congress as section
16 of the new amendment requires that the director’s report include “an analysis of whether
such virtual marking has limited or improved the ability of the general public to access information about patents.” Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §
16(a)(3)(B), 125 Stat. 284, 328 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 292).
277. McCaffrey, supra note 23, at 389-90.
278. Id. at 390.
279. Id. at 384, 398.
280. Id. at 384.
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or commenced on or after, the date of the enactment of this Act.”281 This
could very well spell doom for almost all of the current plaintiffs with
claims pending under Section 292.282
Because of the elimination of the qui tam provision and the requirement of a competitive injury under the amendments, most current plaintiffs
(because they have not alleged any injury) will not be able to continue their
suits for false marking.283 As a matter of fact, most courts have dismissed
these claims on this very premise.284 These amendments deal a “substantial
blow” to the “private false marking enforcement industry,”285 and some
commentators even claim that they are also unconstitutional.286 Although it
may be possible for some of these plaintiffs to either encourage those that
are competitively harmed to bring suit or try to allege an actual injury to
them personally due to the marking, this would be difficult and costly.287
The statistics show that as of the beginning of October 2011, weeks after
the passage and signing of the America Invents Act, parties to false marking litigation were still settling.288 It appears that only time will tell how
federal courts will sort out the fate of these pending claims.

281. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §16(b)(4), 125 Stat.
284, 329 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 292).
282. Rydstrom et al., supra note 8, at 16-17 (“If passed by the House and Senate, this
bill would effectively eliminate all incentive and most suits for false marking.”).
283. Dalton & Stanley, supra note 207, at 14 (“[T]his type of plaintiff would not be
able to go after companies with these allegations.”); see also Steven Seidenber, A New
Mother of Invention: After Years of Setbacks, Patent Reform Finally Makes It Through,
A.B.A.
J.,
Dec.
2011,
at
16-17,
available
at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_new_mother_of_invention_after_years_of_s
etbacks_patent_reform/; Petersen, supra note 6, at 9, 22 (“The new law severely restricts the
recoveries of patent marking trolls, to the point of their substantial elimination” and “[m]ost
of the litigation for false marking under 35 U.S.C. § 292 has been eliminated.”).
284. Kilts Res. LLC v. Uniden Direct USA, Inc., No. 2:10–cv–517–TJW, 2011 WL
5320651, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2011) (dismissing a false marking claim without prejudice because the relator did not plead a competitive injury).
285. Rydstrom et al., supra note 8, at 17.
286. Davis, supra note 232 (pointing out Professor Ernest Young’s argument that the
new law eliminates plaintiffs’ vested property interests in litigation and is therefore unconstitutional).
287. Id.; Granaghan, supra note 30, at 496-97 (stating that a competitive injury under
false marking may “encompass” the harm to an individual in deterring their research in
another industry, to those who are not yet competitors, and to the general public from the
false sense of the higher quality of a product).
288. Settlement Payments Received for Section 292 Cases—2011, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE,
25
(2011),
http://www.justice.gov/civil/common/elecread/2011/FalsePatent%20Marking%20Summary
%202011.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2011).
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PROPOSED STATUTORY FIXES TO SECTION 292

As illustrated above, there appear to be several concerns regarding the
new amendments to Section 292. In this final section, this Comment will
offer some fixes to the statute, many of which counter the new amendments, in order to try and restore the utility of the FMA while eliminating
the troll problems that had recently arisen. First, while looking at the effect
of the troll problems specifically, this Comment will make an argument to
eliminate the qui tam provision, and replace the “competitive injury” language with the term “injury.” Next, this Comment will call for reverting
back to the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of “unpatented article” in Solo
Cup,289 which included expired patents. An analysis of the proper level of
intent for a violation under the statute will follow, concluding that recklessness is the best fit. Subsequently, an argument will be made for keeping the
Federal Circuit’s “per article” interpretation under Bon Tool with a slight
twist. And lastly, after discussing the potential of virtual marking and applying it to the proposed changes, two further significant alternatives to
these changes will be highlighted.
A.

QUI TAM PLAINTIFFS AND COMPETITIVE INJURIES

As most commentators would agree, the primary cause of the spawning of the “cottage industry” of “false marking trolls” was Section 292’s qui
tam provision.290 Once we take a look at the problems associated with this
cottage industry, it will be clear that the provision as originally written
should not return.
1.

The Costs of the Trolls

Some commentators recognize that after the Federal Circuit’s decision
in In re BP it became increasingly difficult for qui tam litigators to survive
motions to dismiss with pleading standards under FRCP 9(b) slightly decreasing the rush of these plaintiffs.291 One of the main problems with Section 292’s qui tam provision, however, was not necessarily qui tam post289. See Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“We
agree with Pequignot that an article covered by a now-expired patent is ‘unpatented.’”).
290. Schlichter & Calico, supra note 5 (reporting that in just the three months after
the Bon Tool decision, over 130 lawsuits had been filed, mainly by qui tam plaintiffs).
291. Rydstrom et al., supra note 8, at 1313 (“[T]he heightened standard may deter
relator suits because in most cases, relators simply will not have access to information that
illustrates mismarkers knew their patents had expired.”); Garrity & Zablocki, supra note 31,
at 33 (“At minimum, applying a heightened pleading standard at the outset of the complaint
requires plaintiffs to conduct a more rigorous pre-filing investigation, which will result in
fewer false marking claims being filed.”).
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trial judgments, but the clogging of the federal courts and the high cost of
patent litigation for defendants, which could be passed on to consumers.
Many times qui tam relators do not have the public interest in mind
when pursuing such suits, nor do they have the necessary incentive to keep
the public interest in mind.292 Not only can this mean possible secret settlements, but also “overenforcement” of the qui tam statute.293 In fact, qui tam
relators, as shown clearly in the history of these informer actions in England, may instead have an incentive to file fraudulent and malicious claims
against defendants in the hopes of a monetary award.294 As Professor Randy
Beck remarked, relators, to ensure this award, would try to “eliminate the
exercise of disinterested prosecutorial discretion—an important protection
for both the public and the individual—and to transform law enforcement
into a business pursued for the private enrichment of profit-motivated bounty hunters.”295
If the public was never actually harmed by a defendant’s behavior (violative of the statute or not), these lawsuits essentially mean that the public
then “incur[s] substantial costs in processing and defending these lawsuits”
without any real benefit to society.296 This cost is manifested with the additional costs and constraints on the judicial system and the higher prices for
the manufacturer’s products that will result.297 Patent litigation is not cheap
by any means,298 and prosecuting and defending meritless claims drives up
the costs for everyone.299
The actions of defendants in response to the increased risk of liability
brought on by the unleashing of these trolls also show how the qui tam provision undermined the FMA. Many defendants and intellectual property
practitioners were seriously contemplating merely removing the marks on
292. Granaghan, supra note 30, at 489-90.
293. Id. at 490; see also Beck, supra note 178, at 548.
294. See Beck, supra note 178, at 581-83.
295. Id. at 549.
296. Granaghan, supra note 30, at 491. Apparently, Congress also agreed with this
assertion in amending the FMA: “Congress perceived that the drastic increase in qui
tam false marking lawsuits was forcing companies to divert resources from innovation and
product creation to time-consuming and expensive litigation.” Rogers v. Conair Corp., No.
10-1497, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58110, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2012).
297. See Granaghan, supra note 30, at 491; see also Deutsch, supra note 228, at 84950 (arguing that the public benefit of qui tam “prowling” is “unlikely to be worth the resulting cost to manufacturers, a cost eventually passed on to consumers in some form”).
298. See, e.g., Milone & Ahmad, supra note 211 (“According to the American Intellectual Property Law Association Report of the Economic Survey 2009, the median costs for
patent litigation range from $650,000 to $5,500,000.”).
299. Deutsch, supra note 228, at 849-50 (“There is little room for argument that
potential qui tam relators prowling for a vulnerable false mark would spur manufacturers to
honestly and accurately mark their products. But the benefit is unlikely to be worth the resulting cost to manufacturers, a cost eventually passed on to consumers in some form.”).
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patented products to avoid the risk of false marking suits and liability.300
Quite clearly, this would undermine the very purpose of the FMA, which
was to give notice to the public of patent rights.301 Some intellectual property lawyers were advising licensors to negotiate warranties or indemnification for mismarking,302 or go as far as auditing each item that is being sold
to make sure marking is proper.303 Others were recommending that manufacturers hire outside counsel to execute full-scale portfolio checks304 or
look into the possibility of insurance for false marking liability.305 None of
these options are cheap for defendant manufacturers, which ultimately
means higher product prices for the consumer and the general public.
2.

Change the “Competitive Injury” Language to “Injury”

As pointed out above, requiring a plaintiff to show a competitive injury to have standing to sue under the new FMA may drain the pool of available plaintiffs to meaningfully enforce Section 292.306 As one commentator
put it, false marking can injure those that are not direct competitors, including those that are conducting research in another industry, individuals or
entities that are not yet competitors, and the general public (by resulting in
consumers paying higher prices for what appear to be higher-quality products).307 This contention is likely correct and adopting a statutory “injury”
300. See, e.g., Schlichter & Calico, supra note 5.
301. Tony Zeuli, Trial Lawyer’s Notebook: To Mark or Not to Mark, INTELL. PROP.
TODAY, 18 (Mar. 2010), http://www.iptoday.com/issues/2010/03/trial-lawyers-notebook-tomark-or-not-to-mark.asp (“[S]ome patent owners have already determined that the risk is not
worth the potential benefits of marking. Frankly, that is an unfortunate real-world result
because it undermines the important public notice function of marking one’s products with
patent numbers.”); see also Granaghan, supra note 30, at 491 (“[T]his rash of lawsuits may
deter others from properly marking for fear of being sued.”); Cotter, supra note 260, at 18687, 290-91 (discussing the detrimental effects of overenforcement and excessive fines under
the FMA).
302. Keith R. Derrington & Jeffrey S. Whittle, Mitigating Risks of Patent Licensing
After Forest Group v. Bon Tool Co., 45 LES NOUVELLES 140, 145 (2010).
303. Daly & Kimbell, supra note 209, at 34.
304. Schlichter & Calico, supra note 5.
305. Michael F. Aylward, Covering Your Tracks: Will There Be Insurance Coverage
for False Marking Claims?, LANDSLIDE, May/June 2011, at 2, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/landslide/landslide_june_2011/ay
lward_landslide_mayjune_2011.authcheckdam.pdf (“It is these potential liabilities that have
prompted insureds’ interest in obtaining coverage for such claims from their liability insurers.”).
306. See Granaghan, supra note 30, at 497.
307. Id. at 496-97. At least one court has hinted that false patent marking may mislead the customer into thinking that a product is original or of a higher quality. See Lubber,
Inc. v. Optari, LLC, No. 3:11-0042, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116293, at *27 (M.D. Tenn. Oct.
6, 2011).
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requirement would be preferred over a qui tam provision,308 but it should be
applied with a definitive test already widely used in intellectual property
law.
Although it is possible that the general public and researchers that are
not direct competitors will be able to show an injury-in-fact, this has already proved extremely difficult for plaintiffs, even those that are market
competitors.309 Courts would probably have to consider standing for these
plaintiffs on an individual basis, but a hint as to how they might do this is
found in Professor Cotter’s ideas relating to “optimal fines.”310 Professor
Cotter suggests that courts “approximate the social harm caused by actionable false marking” by taking into account the plaintiff’s loss and the defendant’s gain, “the plausibility of substantial . . . quantifiable harms to
consumers and to nonparty competitors,” and the risks of either
“underdeterring statutory violations” or “chilling patentees” from marking

308. Granaghan, supra note 30, at 496-97 (“Thus, the term competitive injury should
merely be replaced with the term injury. If a plaintiff can show the three requirements for
standing—injury in fact, a causal connection between the alleged injury and the defendant’s
conduct, and an injury that is likely to be redressed by the courts—then the plaintiff should
have standing to sue for false marking.”).
309. See id. In fact, most courts have used very high standards for finding a tangible
competitive injury, and most competitor cases have been dismissed under the amended act,
demonstrating how difficult it could be for legitimate plaintiffs to adequately plead a claim
in the future. See, e.g., Rogers v. Conair Corp., No. 10-1497, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58110,
at *16-17 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2012) (dismissing a claim under the amended act because a
competitor did not plead “tangible economic loss caused by the illegal competitive means,”
i.e., facts from which the court could find “a plausible causal connection between any difficulty Plaintiff experienced in obtaining retail shelf space or selling his product” and defendant’s marking practices); Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Kids II, Inc., No. 10-CV-00988A(F), 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146553, at *29 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2011) (dismissing a claim because a
competitor did not “plausibly establish” that, as a result of a plaintiff’s mismarking of its
products, “Defendant’s ability to compete against Plaintiffs in the market for purchasers of
such products was impaired, resulting in tangible economic loss to Defendant”); Advanced
Cartridge Techs., LLC v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 8:10-cv-486-T-23TGW, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 146942, at *8-13 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2011) (dismissing a competitor’s false marking
claim because no injury-in-fact was pleaded to satisfy standing under Article III, and the
competitor did not adequately plead a competitive injury for prudential standing typically
used in unfair competition claims). But see Fasteners For Retail, Inc. v. Andersen, No. 11 C
2164, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124937, at *15-16 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2011) (stating that Defendant adequately pleaded a competitive injury in its counterclaim for false marking by
alleging that the Plaintiff’s marking was “likely to, or at least has the tendency to, discourage
and deter persons and companies, such as K International, from commercializing competing
products and deters consumers from using competing products” (internal quotations marked
omitted)). This split likely has to do with a major problem with the amended Act—it does
not define what constitutes a “competitive injury”! Crudo, supra note 231, at 585.
310. Cotter, supra note 260, at 182 (discussing how courts should determine penalties under the FMA).
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their products.311 The objective is to fine a violator by calculating the social
harm/private gain from the false marking in order to make this type of
marking unprofitable for manufacturers.312 This reasoning may open the
door for a noncompetitor to file a false marking claim under Section 292 if
they could demonstrate that the defendant’s unfair gain from the false
marking and/or quantifiable harm to the public was substantial.313 As one
commentator pointed out, factors such as these can be used by plaintiffs to
calculate the false marking’s social harm and assess the culpability of the
defendant,314 which in turn the author believes could adequately demonstrate an injury. If this public harm or wrongful private gain could be quantified, it may then be labeled an “injury” under Section 292(a) and a wider
pool of plaintiffs would be able to sue.
More realistic and likely more testable, however, would be an interpretation allowing plaintiffs to assert a quantifiable “injury” as a future competitor. “Patent misuse,” although typically an affirmative defense, is used
to prevent a patentee from obtaining certain market benefits beyond their
patent rights and thereby stifling competition.315 If alleged patent misuse is
not per se patent misuse or specified by 35 U.S.C. § 271(d),316 it is typically
analyzed under the “rule of reason,” which is utilized when a “practice’s
effect is to extend the patentee’s statutory rights and [it] does so with an
anti-competitive effect.”317 Specifically, courts could use principles from
the doctrine of patent misuse to discern whether there is a “reasonable
probability” that a plaintiff could enter that particular product’s market and
would be subsequently deterred from entering that market based on a de-

311. Id.; see also Deming, supra note 213, at 197, 213 (adopting Cotter’s factors
when calculating false marking damages).
312. Id. at 191-92.
313. Other interpretations, such as Professor Winston’s, also allow for this possibility. See Winston, supra note 130, at 148-49 (“[D]amages should reflect the culpability of the
marking party, taking into account various factors, including whether the public was deceived, the materiality of the false marking, and the effect of the false marking on the competition. Any other interpretation is flawed and renders ineffectual the true purpose of the
false marking statute: to punish those who harm the public’s trust in the patent system.”).
314. See Kublin, supra note 210, at 89 (arguing that instead of eliminating the qui
tam provision, relators should be able to bring false marking claims and receive damages
based on a defendant’s culpability).
315. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
316. It may be argued, however, that false marking falls under Section 271(d)’s first
specified patent misappropriation, which merely requires the defendant to “derive[] revenue
from acts which if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory
infringement of the patent” 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006).
317. Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure, Inc., No. 9:07-CV-104, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 25050, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2009).
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fendant’s false marking.318 Although this analysis may necessitate an application of antitrust law,319 the concept of the “reasonable probability” of
“procompetitive entry” into a market could be a way to assess whether future competitors would have likely entered a product market but for the
false marking of a manufacturer.320
A short illustration, after looking at a very recent case, Lubber, Inc. v.
Optari,321 comes to mind. In Lubber, after the separation of two business
partners, the defendants began a campaign to confuse and mislead customers regarding the tote bags that these partners previously sold together.322
Specifically, the defendants placed “patent pending” on the bottom of the
bags to lead the public to believe that the whole bag was under patent review, as opposed to merely the bag’s straps.323 The court ultimately allowed
a false marking claim against the defendants (post-America Invents Act)
because the plaintiff and defendants were direct competitors,324 but would
this result have been different if the plaintiff had not yet been selling his
tote bags? In other words, should a false marking claim be disallowed in
this same situation if the plaintiff had not yet started marketing or selling
what was his original invention?325 A claim should clearly exist in this type
of situation. The “reasonable probability” of this plaintiff entering the “tote
bag” market is apparent here, and the harm of the defendant’s actions is
real, regardless of whether both parties are currently active in the market.326
As with any competitive injury, this sort of injury may not be easy for
a plaintiff to prove under Section 292 in many cases, but using a mere “in318. See, e.g., Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (requiring
the defendant to show there was a “reasonable probability” that he “would have matured into
a competitive force in” a particular market to establish an affirmative defense of patent misuse, adopting the Supreme Court’s standard in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378
U.S. 158, 175-76 (1964)).
319. Id. at 1351-52 (“In addressing the issue of anti-competitive effects, we look to
antitrust authorities.”).
320. See, e.g., Mercantile Tex. Corp. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve, 638 F.2d
1255, 1268-69 (5th Cir. 1981) (recognizing the circuit split involving the “potential competition doctrine,” but ultimately adopting the Second Circuit’s use of the “reasonable probability” standard in assessing a future competitor’s potential entrance into the marketplace).
Allowing for the use of this principle should correct some of the under-inclusiveness of the
FMA, which does not include future competitors. See Crudo, supra note 233, at 586.
321. Lubber, Inc. v. Optari, No. 3:11-0042, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116293 (M.D.
Tenn. Oct. 6, 2011).
322. See id. at *2-8, *23-27.
323. Id. at *27.
324. Lubber, Inc. v. Optari, No. 3:11-0042, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116293, at *27
(M.D. Tenn. Oct. 6, 2011).
325. Id. at *2 (explaining how the plaintiff invented the tote bags and constructed the
business).
326. See id.
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jury” standard would better allow for such an analysis, and in turn better
allow for more of those actually harmed by the marking to file suit. Therefore, the elimination of the qui tam provision should be offset with a mere
injury requirement to file suit under Section 292.
B.

CONSTRUE EXPIRED PATENTS AS “UNPATENTED ARTICLES”

Recall that the Federal Circuit in Solo Cup held that expired patents
were “unpatented articles” under the FMA because they continued to impose costs on the general public in requiring a person to research a patent’s
validity, which can be difficult.327 Explained above were the possible problems regarding expired patents and some of the reasons why eliminating the
Federal Circuit’s interpretation could hurt the purpose of the FMA overall.
In this section, an example of how this harm to the public results is given,
and the author will address some of the arguments as to why expired patents may not violate the principles of false marking.
There are a few commentators who have argued that expired patents
should not be considered “unpatented articles,” and their arguments are
similar. Primarily, they contend that expired patent numbers place a substantially lighter burden on the public than false numbers because expired
patent numbers direct the public and competitors or researchers to the patent’s documentation.328 A potential competitor will also validate the patent
anyway if he is serious about entering the market or avoiding infringement
by using this information.329 Looking at precedent and statutory language,
proponents of this argument claim that unpatented articles were simply not
what the statute was originally addressing, and defining the statute this
broadly has actually influenced manufacturers not to mark against the obligations of Section 287.330 Further, they contend that “public policy strongly
supports a holding that once patented is always patented” because consumers are “not deceived as to the article’s fitness for patenting when it is
marked with an expired patent number,” nor does this number confer any
special quality status for the product.331 Allowing for expired patents will
give the marker of the product the opportunity “to provide useful information without imposing an undue burden on the public,” prevent incentives not to mark, “avert[] exploitative litigation such as Solo Cup,” and
327. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
328. Arneson, supra note 13, at 669; Deutsch, supra note 228, at 841-42 (“If looking
up a patent imposes too great a burden on a would-be inventor, perhaps the exchange of
exclusive rights granted for public disclosure that the patent system is based upon needs to
be recalibrated.”).
329. Deutsch, supra note 228, at 842.
330. Arneson, supra note 13, at 673-74.
331. Id. at 676-77.
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also “limit[] the enforcement of the false marking statute to violations that
have the potential to cause serious harm to the public.”332
Public and competitive harm can still result from the continued use of
expired patents, however. Let us use an example that everyone reading this
article can probably relate to. Picture this: you are scrolling through law
review and journal articles to use for an article that you plan to write regarding juvenile justice. You are breezing through what seem to be credible
sources and you are just looking for one more decent article on a particular
point of law. You come across two articles that are on point and begin to
skim them, noticing that one article is fairly long and lined with footnotes
and the other is almost as long but has few footnotes. In the interest of time,
you make a final decision to scrap the article with fewer footnotes and fully
read the one with more footnotes, thinking that the more support that the
article has, the more likely it is credible.
This is analogous to the false marking problem, at least in relation to
quality and falsity.333 Instead of you, a student, lawyer, or professional
looking for an article, pretend it is the average consumer, Jim, or a passing
competitor/investor browsing the shelves of a grocery store. Jim is looking
for a product to buy, and the competitor is searching for ideas to model and
products to consider while avoiding copyright/patent infringement. The two
law review articles above are two very similar-looking bottles of shampoo
at the grocery store that the competitor and the consumer are interested in
either to purchase the product or gain knowledge about its design. Both
these people notice the patent number on the first bottle but also notice the
absence of such a number on the second bottle. The consumer, thinking that
the first product has gone through the patent process and that the manufacturer or patentee has invested the time and effort to obtain and/or maintain
certain patent rights, decides to purchase the first bottle, thinking it may be
of greater quality. The competitor (or possibly future competitor or investor) notices how close the design is for both bottles and decides that it is too
risky to copy or model his future product on either due to the patent number. He decides to either design around the two bottles or move to the next
row to see if he can find another bottle that is not patented to help generate
332.

Id. at 678-79.
A patent confers no government endorsement as to the quality of the invention or suitability for a particular purpose. A patent merely recognizes that an invention is new, useful, non-obvious, and disclosed in compliance with a number of statutory requirements. That the patent marking was never intended to confer special status on the patentee in the
marketplace indicates the patentee is not losing anything they were entitled to in the first place.
Deutsch, supra note 228, at 843.
333. Grant, supra note 21, at 289-91; Granaghan, supra note 30, at 481.
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ideas. Both of their decisions were fairly quick, and both times the mere
existence of the patent number influenced their ultimate decisions regarding
the
bottles.
Going back to the original example, just the existence of footnotes
implies that the article may have some greater quality.334 The situation is
even more complicated and deceitful when the footnote has authority that
may be wrong, misleading, or (in the case of legal research) no longer good
or applicable law.335 Expired patent numbers may not be as deceitful as
those that never existed as a legitimate patent number for a particular product.336 However, expired patent numbers can still influence the decisions of
consumers in the marketplace and may even influence the decisions of
competitors that stumble upon the product and do not bother to look up the
patent.337 Thus, some harm of deceit (and disadvantage to competitors) can
result from expired patents, and this type of harm should accordingly fall
334. No authority has been given to back up this assertion. However, if you did not
make it to the footnotes (analogous to looking up the patent), you would have never discovered this. You, as the reader, may think that the assertion is well-founded because it has a
footnote. How often do we check the footnotes for journals, books, law reviews, magazine
articles, and so forth to see if what they are saying has any authority to back it up?
335. Jonathon Meyerson, The False Marking Paradigm, 344 B.S. L. REV. 126, 129
(2009). The previous footnote puts you on notice that there is no authority for that assertion.
On the other hand, what if it did have authority that was wrong or inapplicable? The article
just cited in this footnote, for example, is completely made up and does not exist. But did
you look it up in order to see if it actually said what I asserted, or did you assume that it was
a credible article because it looked good and got through the law review editing process?
336. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (agreeing with
the district court that a weaker presumption of intent to deceive the public arises from expired-patent marking).
337. See Grant, supra note 21, at 289-92; O’Neill, supra note 36, at 23 (“Moreover,
identifying a product as being patented may provide market credibility or a marketing advantage. Indeed, it is very common for patent owners to advertise their products as being
‘patented’ and ‘the benefits of marking a patented product can be—and often are—
significant.’”). Honestly, I did not know how to look up the validity of a patent before this
past summer. How many consumers actually know how to do this? See Teichner, supra note
135, at 1392-93, for a short discussion of the problems and costs of looking up patents in the
early nineteenth century. One commentator sums up the public concerns demonstrated above
quite nicely:
False marking defeats the goal of patent law because it deprives society
of new technology by discouraging inventors and researchers from creating similar inventions for fear of infringing. Even if companies are not
deterred from entering the market, they may unnecessarily waste resources trying to find ways to design around the falsely marked article.
Companies, regardless of their sophistication, are oftentimes unwilling
or unable to expend the time and resources to determine whether the patent does in fact cover the marked article because this involves interpreting seemingly intractable technical language in the patent disclosure.
Crudo, supra note 233, at 577-78.
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under the FMA,338 even if the presumption of social harm is to a lesser degree.
Moreover, besides the fact that the public and competitors may still be
harmed and deceived by expired marking, having to do unnecessary research and mistaking the marks as an indication of higher quality,339 the
concerns surrounding expired patents can be resolved by new methods of
marking. Problems like the high costs of remarking products, possible “exploitative litigation” involving mass-marking issues, and manufacturers
simply not marking may be offset by various uses of virtual marking.340 Not
only could virtual marking allow for a cheaper way to give the public notice
of a patent mark’s status and validity, it could then provide the appropriate
information to those who are interested in further reviewing the patent’s
details, similar to expired patents.341 It becomes that much easier to keep
the patent information updated and encourages manufacturers to avoid all
deception by simply adding the expiration date next to the patent number on
a website.342 These assertions and examples demonstrate that Congress
should recognize Solo Cup’s interpretation and reinstate expired patents as
violative of the FMA.
C.

LOWER THE INTENT REQUIREMENT

As seen from the many examples of false marking cases that did not
survive the pleading stage, the intent to deceive the public requirement under Section 292 remains a problem for many plaintiffs.343 The Federal Cir338. See Winston, supra note 130, at 126-28 (“After the change in the marking requirement, because an expired patent is unenforceable and due to the importance of the
public’s ability to rely on the patent marking, if a marking of an innovation as reading on a
patent when the patent has expired was done with the intent to deceive the public, the marking should be found to violate the false marking statute.”). As one commentator stated, it
seems that Congress completely ignored this kind of public injury altogether when reforming
Section 292. See Crudo, supra note 233, at 573.
339. See Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Shipley, 643 F.3d 1346, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
False marking can injure the public interest in full and free competition
“because the act of false marking misleads the public into believing that
a patentee controls the article in question (as well as like articles), externalizes the risk of error in the determination, placing it on the public rather than the manufacturer or seller of the article, and increases the cost
to the public of ascertaining whether a patentee in fact controls the intellectual property embodied in an article.”
Id. (quoting Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
340. See McCaffrey, supra note 23, at 389-90.
341. Id. at 389.
342. Id. at 390.
343. See, e.g., Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(agreeing with the district court in finding that Solo Cup did not act for the purpose of de-
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cuit affirmed this requirement in In re BP, which then made it even more
difficult for plaintiffs to pass the pleading stage because it required plaintiffs to plead particular facts alleging the fraudulent marking.344 This requirement is still intact after the recent amendments and will most likely
continue to pose difficulties for competitors seeking damages under the new
provisions.345 This elevated pleading requirement is inconsistent with the
purpose of the FMA and should be lowered to adequately enforce the prohibition against deceiving the public.346
As demonstrated in the previous section, harm to competitors and the
public can result from the mere existence of an expired patent on an article.347 Even if the FMA does allow for expired patents to constitute false
marking, manufacturers would still be able to avoid liability under the FMA
and reap marking benefits if they simply did not replace an expired patent
number because it would remain extremely difficult for a plaintiff to prove
that the continued marking was performed with an intent to deceive the
public.348 Because finding that the defendant had knowledge of a false
marking is quite difficult and the harm to the public results from the marking alone and not a defendant’s intent,349 there has to be a balance between
the requisite intent and the actual harm to the public.
The Federal Circuit discussed this scienter requirement in Clontech,
stating that it was “a state of mind arising when a party acts with sufficient
knowledge that what it is saying is not so and consequently that the recipient of its saying will be misled into thinking that the statement is true.” 350
ceiving the public); Arcadia Mach. & Tool, Inc. v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 786 F.2d 1124,
1125 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Paramount is the court’s finding and conclusion that Arcadia had
totally failed, after at least nine months of discovery, to produce any evidence of intent to
deceive the public. Nor had it produced ‘any evidence suggesting that evidence of intent
could be produced at the time of trial.’”).
344. E.g., Simonian v. Astellas Pharma US Inc., No. 10C 1539, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 32899, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2011) (dismissing the case because plaintiff “failed
to sufficiently plead the requisite intent for false marking”); see also Dalton & Stanley,
supra note 207, at 5 (explaining that most false marking cases after In re BP were being
subjected to motions to dismiss for failure to plead the necessary facts under Rule 9(b)).
345. See Kublin, supra note 210, at 71.
346. Grant, supra note 21, at 300. Grant also points out the intent’s inconsistency
with the FTC’s advertising standards, which has the same purpose of avoiding public deception. Id.; see also Granaghan, supra note 30, at 494 (“The harm that flows from mismarking
does not depend on whether there was intent to deceive—the mismarking itself causes the
harm.”).
347. See Grant supra note 21; supra Part V.B.
348. See Grant, supra note 21, at 303 (“[A] lower scienter requirement would allow
courts to sanction manufacturers who realize they are mismarking but nonetheless continue
because of their own interests.”).
349. See Winston, supra note 130, at 130; Granaghan, supra note 30, at 494.
350. Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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Continuing, the court then mixed a bit of negligence with knowledge to
construct the defendant’s necessary culpability:351
[I]n order to establish knowledge of falsity the plaintiff
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the party accused of false marking did not have a reasonable belief
that the articles were properly marked . . . absent such
proof of lack of reasonable belief, no liability under the
statute ensues.352
After Solo Cup reconstructed this standard to make knowledge of the expiration of a patent a rebuttable presumption of the requisite intent for a false
marking claim, it has posed some difficulty for courts.353
Consequently, commentators and scholars have proposed lowering the
minimum intent requirement for a violation of the statute. At least one has
argued that as soon as a defendant receives knowledge that a patent number
does not cover an article and continues to mark, liability under the statute
should kick in.354 This “knowledge” intent requirement “would allow courts
to sanction manufacturers who realize they are mismarking but nonetheless
continue because of their own interests.”355 Another commentator argues
that a plaintiff should only need to show a defendant lacked “a reasonable
belief that the patent reads on the marked product” correctly for the requisite intent to deceive the public.356 A negligence standard, he argues, would
address the harm in the market that inevitably results from false marking
when the manufacturer does not intend to deceive the public or market
competitors.357
Because of the difficulty of showing fraudulent intent and the harm
that results from false marking regardless of manufacturers’ or patentees’
351. As a matter of fact, at least one commentator has characterized the intent requirement from Clontech as similar to negligence, but after In re BP, it is fairly clear that
more than mere negligence must be pled and discovered. O’Neill, supra note 36, at 24 (“The
§ 292 standard arguably is more akin to the standard required to establish a common law
negligent misrepresentation claim, namely, that the defendant made a representation that it
knew or should have known would mislead the public.”).
352. Id. at 1352-53.
353. See Winston, supra note 130, at 132-32; Kublin, supra note 210, at 76-77.
354. See generally Grant, supra note 21, at 302-03.
355. Id. at 303.
356. Granaghan, supra note 30, at 493.
357. Id. at 494 (“[B]ecause the injury of mismarking occurs regardless of intent to
deceive, a company should not be able to mark any product that it manufactures with a patent without some reasonable belief that the article covers the product, even if there is no
intent to deceive. If the public is meant to endure the limited monopoly conferred by a patent, the patent holder should be expected to know (or have a reasonable belief about) what
the patent covers.”).
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intent to defraud, the scienter requirement of Section 292 should certainly
be changed. As another commentator illustrated, if the intent requirement is
to remain high (e.g., knowledge), the burden of proof under Section 292
should be elevated to match that of fraud (i.e., a clear and convincing evidence standard as opposed to a preponderance standard).358 The heightened
pleading standard under FRCP 9(b), which now applies to false marking
cases after In re BP, is primarily used in common-law fraud cases.359 Likewise, if the scienter requirement were lowered to as low as negligence, applying a preponderance standard would continue to make sense, but the
Federal Circuit would have to seriously consider going back to general
pleading standards under FRCP 8(c). It appears that the way the statute
reads now is inconsistent and not retainable.360
Accordingly, we must find and apply the middle ground, which is
reckless intent. A knowledge requirement is too high, not only because it
fails to address the harm that results from those that unintentionally falsely
mark items,361 but also because it could also encourage manufacturers to
purposely look the other way when marking items and claim lack of
knowledge. On the other hand, a negligence standard is too low because it
would encourage competitors and others to continue to scour grocery store
shelves to find products with expired patents to file suit and would essentially continue the march of the marking trolls. These new trolls could argue
that such sophisticated manufacturers should have known that their product’s patent numbers had expired, a technique that qui tam relators had already started using.362
If the statute’s purpose is to avoid deceit on the public and not just
punish the fraudulent intent of manufacturers and patentees, then the best
option would be to keep the preponderance standard, lower the scienter
requirement to recklessness (a conscious disregard),363 and instate a basic
358. See generally Teichner, supra note 135, at 1398, 1409-12.
359. Id. at 1410.
360. See generally Kublin, supra note 210, at 71-72 (arguing that Section 292’s qui
tam provision should remain but the pleading standard should be lowered and damages
should be based on a defendant’s culpability).
361. Granaghan, supra note 30, at 493.
362. See, e.g., Kirkwood Florist, Inc. v. Hi-Float, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1006
(E.D. Mo. 2011). In Kirkwood, a relator argued that the defendant should have had
knowledge of the expiration of its patents because it was a company that was familiar with
intellectual property and the procurement of patents and had a “sophisticated intellectual
property counsel.” Id.; see also Granaghan, supra note 30, at 494 (“Because of the enormous
benefit of a patent, a patent holder should be required to obtain a reasonable belief, likely by
consulting with a patent attorney, that its product is indeed covered by its patent.”).
363. Reckless intent would also utilize the concept of “conscious disregard” and
would resemble the Model Penal Code’s culpability standards in Section 2.02:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
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pleading standard under FRCP 8(c). Piecing together the factors that the
commentators and scholars mentioned above have presented to determine
damages, social harm, and the culpability of a false marker, the courts
should look to four main factors on a case-by-case basis when determining
gross negligence or recklessness of a defendant. They would include the
likelihood of discovery or knowledge of the false marking or expiration of
the patent at issue; the length of time the falsely marked product has been
on the market; the resulting social harm from the marking taking into account materiality, competitive harm, and public harm; and the sophistication of the manufacturer or patentee and their access to intellectual property
legal counsel.
This new scienter element should closely resemble the fraudulent intent requirement that federal courts have applied to securities fraud cases
under Section 10b-5 of the Security Exchange Act of 1934.364 Under 10b-5
(if knowledge of falsity was not present), a defendant must have made a
material misstatement with “conscious or reckless disregard of its falsity.”
Reckless disregard is typically shown by circumstantial evidence or by establishing a motive and opportunity to commit fraud.365 Reckless conduct in
this regard is behavior that is “an extreme departure from the standards of
ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers
that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must
have been aware of it.”366 The new recklessness standard for false marking
should resemble that of false and misleading statements under federal securities law because they look at relatively similar factors in deciding a defendant’s culpability (e.g., materiality, circumstantial evidence, social
the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must
be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose
of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a lawabiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c).
364. Section 10b-5 of the SEC Security Exchange Rules states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
a. To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
b. To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
c. To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
365. In re ATI Techs., Inc., Sec. Litig., 216 F. Supp. 2d 418, 428 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
366. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977).
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harm), and 10b-5 was similarly created to protect members of the public
(investors) from deceit and fraudulent activity in the marketplace.367 The
appropriateness of this new minimum intent requirement is furthered by the
fact that the FCA already partially defines “knowing” or “knowingly” as
“acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.”368
In applying this new standard, the rebuttable presumption of intent to
deceive the public with expired patents under Solo Cup would be substantially similar, except that the false marking alone would create the presumption, and to rebut, a defendant would have to show by a preponderance that
he did not falsely mark the product in a reckless manner.369 Thus, we would
presume that a defendant intended to deceive the public by merely marking
items falsely, while the provision would still supply a safe harbor for those
that honestly, but unreasonably, forgot to update a patent number, or simply
made a mistake while marking an article.370 As a result, the change could
work as a good incentive for manufactures to keep updated patent portfolios, and would not allow manufacturers and patentees to consciously ignore
Section 292.
Under this new system requiring a plaintiff to show some form of “injury” (through high defendant culpability, a quantifiable social harm, or a
competitive injury) while proving a reckless intent by the defendant to mark
items falsely, “it may be difficult for individual consumers to show actual
damages” or present a meritorious claim.371 Then again, after instating some
form of compensatory system, lowering the scienter requirement of the
FMA this way and relaxing the pleading standards could make survival of

367. To adequately plead under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must claim “(1) a specific
false or misleading statement in connection with the purchase or sale of a security (2) of a
material fact (3) with the intention that it should be acted upon, (4) upon which plaintiff
relied (5) to plaintiff’s detriment.” Klebanow v. NUI Corp. (In re NUI Sec. Litig.), 314 F.
Supp. 2d 388, 398 (D. N.J. 2004); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988)
(“An investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance on the
integrity of that price. Because most publicly available information is reflected in market
price, an investor’s reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be
presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.”).
368. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(iii) (emphasis added).
369. See Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1362-64 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(“[T]he combination of a false statement and knowledge that the statement was false creates
a rebuttable presumption of intent to deceive the public . . . [t]hus, Solo’s burden of proof is
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it did not have the requisite purpose to
deceive.”).
370. See Winston, supra note 130, at 131 (“Intent is absent if the false marking is an
inadvertent oversight or mistake on the part of the patentee.”).
371. See Granaghan, supra note 30, at 497-98 (arguing further that “[i]f a consumer
can show an adequate injury, there is no reason why that person should not be allowed recovery,” and such suits “may be amenable to class actions”).
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frivolous claims more difficult while allowing for meritorious claims to
have a better chance of pushing through.372
D.

KEEP THE “PER ARTICLE” INTERPRETATION OF BON TOOL BUT ALLOW
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

As the Federal Circuit highlighted in Bon Tool, a $500 aggregate fine
for violations of Section 292 is not “sufficient financial motivation for
plaintiffs” to file claims under the FMA and would render it ineffective.373
Therefore, it is essential that the core of this decision remains intact for all
plaintiffs,374 but the question still remains as to how allocating damages
would work under this Comment’s proposed fixes.
As Professor Cotter correctly proposed well before the passage of the
new Section 292 amendments, a compensatory system is essential to the
effectiveness of the FMA in approximating the social harm of false marking
while avoiding excessive fines.375 The threat of excessive fines was a primary concern for courts that found Section 292 unconstitutional,376 and, as
seen from recent experience with the false marking trolls, excessive fines
could be counterproductive by “chilling” patentees from marking products
altogether.377 The solution would be to allow for a compensatory system
under the term “injury” in this Comment’s reformulated FMA, but add other remedies into the calculation of damages that depend on who is bringing
the claim and the type of injury that the defendant caused. To better understand the concepts and their application, let us look to three categories of
plaintiffs that would be able to file a false marking claim under the proposed changes: members of the general public, future competitors, and present competitors.
Direct competitors would clearly have the easiest avenue in collecting
damages while pursuing a false marking claim. But as Cotter points out, not
only should we look to lost profits and actual competitive harm, we should
also assess damages based on social harm in relation to the false marking in

372. See Kublin, supra note 210, at 90.
373. Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
374. Kublin, supra note 210, at 85 (“[T]he five hundred dollar maximum total recovery would discourage almost all plaintiffs from bringing suit because expected costs would
far exceed expected damages.”).
375. Cotter, supra note 260, at 182.
376. See Unique Prod. Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 997,
1005-06 (N.D. Ohio 2011), vacated as moot by Unique Prod. Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade
Valve, Inc., 462 F. App’x 967 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Rogers v. Tristar Prods., Inc., 793 F. Supp.
2d 711, 724-25 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
377. Cotter, supra note 260, at 182, 191-92.
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order to remain consistent with the FMA’s purpose.378 He sets out specific
factors that courts should consider in calculating this social harm:
(1) the plaintiff’s loss (if any) and the defendant’s gain (if
any) attributable to the false marking at issue; (2) the plausibility of substantial but less easily quantifiable harms to
consumers and to nonparty competitors; and (3) the risks,
on the one hand, of underdeterring statutory violations if
the penalty is too small and, on the other, of chilling patentees from lawfully marking their products if the risk of
liability is too great.379
The “optimal fine,” according to Cotter, “would be one that forces patentees to internalize the net social costs of false marking, or . . . one that makes
false marking unprofitable to the faux patentee.”380 Cotter suggests that this
is achieved when the fine is “equal to the social harm/private gain.”381 Cotter’s argument and framework are convincing and could be used by courts
to determine additional fines in excess of profit attributed to the false marking. Because this Comment proposes lowering the intent requirement, however, it would be best to limit any damages based on social harm to instances where a defendant had a high level of culpability to avoid any chilling
effect on marking by overcompensating plaintiffs.382 For example, Cotter
raises the possibility of disgorging profits received by the defendant if the
marking was done “willfully or in bad faith.”383 Under this Comment’s new
framework, the defendant would, similar to the law of trademark remedies,
have the burden of showing the portion of profits not attributable to the
false marking.384 Without proof of high culpability, competitor plaintiffs
378. Id. at 191-92.
379. Id. at 182.
380. Id. at 191.
381. Id.
382. See Winston, supra note 130, at 148 (“A balance must be struck between
providing notice to the public and reward to the relator and recognizing the culpability of the
party who has falsely marked its innovation.”); Cotter, supra note 260, at 191-92.
383. Cotter, supra note 260, at 193; see also Granaghan, supra note 30, at 497
(“Thus, in cases of fraudulent intent, it may be appropriate to award treble damages, in the
same way that damages for willful infringement can also be enhanced.”).
384. Cotter, supra note 260, at 193. Cotter likens this compensatory scheme to that of
damages under the Copyright Act, and presents similar factors that courts take into account
when calculating infringement damages:
(1) the expenses saved and the profits reaped; (2) the revenues lost by
the plaintiff; (3) the value of the copyright; (4) the deterrent effect on
others beside the defendant; (5) whether the defendant’s conduct was innocent or wilful; (6) whether a defendant has cooperated in providing
particular records from which to assess the value of the infringing material produced; and (7) the potential for discouraging the defendant.
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would only be able to seek damages from actual competitive harm resulting
from the marking and not disgorgement or treble damages.385
Members of the general public would find it much more difficult to
seek damages under this framework, but it would certainly be possible.
Essentially, they would have to show either that the false marking by the
defendant was willful or in bad faith, or that the quantifiable harm to the
public was substantial.386 An assessment of damages related to substantial
social harm would rest on the second factor in Cotter’s list above, while the
damages available from a defendant’s high culpability in false marking
would consider the factors that Professor Winston provides: “whether the
public was deceived, the materiality of the false marking, and the effect of
the false marking on the competition.”387 A clear example where a substantial quantifiable harm may be found and/or high culpability could probably
be proven would be when a manufacturer explicitly advertises the product
as patented.388 For example, a defendant advertises that his product or design is the “real thing” or is superior in quality to his competitors’ products
or designs because he has maintained a patent for his product/design or has
one pending. If that patent is nonexistent or has expired and the manufacturer is selling its product at a premium price, it would be relatively easy to
calculate damages based on the resulting profits over other competitors, and
it is also easy to see how this practice is highly deceptive to the public.
Future or potential competitors would find similar difficulties in seeking damages under the proposed rule for damages, but again, it would still
be possible. If a court finds that an entity or claimant retains a “reasonable
probability” of entering a defendant’s product market and becoming successful, there is a possibility that competitive damages can be shown.389
These future competitors would similarly have the opportunity to prove
high culpability or substantial quantifiable harm like the general public and

Id. at 193-94.
385. See id. at 197.
386. See id. at 195 (alluding that plaintiffs would have to show quantifiable social
harm or otherwise get nominal damages); Kublin, supra note 210, at 89 (“[T]he amount of
damages should reflect the culpability of the infringer.”); Winston, supra note 130, at 148
(same). This is slightly more expansive than the proposal to use public nuisance law to enforce false marking, which would limit causes of action to those that experienced an injury
that is unique from that suffered by the public at large. See Crudo, supra note 233, at 573-74.
387. Winston, supra note 130, at 148; Kublin, supra note 210, at 89 (agreeing with
Winston’s analysis).
388. Grant, supra note 21, at 289.
389. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer . . . .”).

2012]

PA-‘TROLLING’ THE FALSE MARKING FRONTIER

247

direct competitors,390 but could also attempt to demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct stifled their particular attempts at entering that product’s market and selling products profitably or dissuaded other future competitors
from doing the same.391 If potential or future competitors could show this,
without even demonstrating a higher culpability of the defendant, an acceptable monetary remedy may look something like reasonable royalties
under trademark if an injunction is not possible or requested.392
How would this all coincide with “per article” penalties? According to
some commentators, the “per article” interpretation of the original statute in
Bon Tool should be dropped to allow for only damages based on a defendant’s culpability.393 As shown above, however, false marking is harmful to
the public regardless of a defendant’s culpability, and if some quantifiable
harm to the public can be shown, damages should be awarded.394 This
would stay consistent with the punitive nature of the statute.395 Further, it is
best not to return to the stagnant FMA pre-Bon Tool and allow for such
harmful false marking to continue.396 Instead, courts should use the flexibility that Bon Tool offers by considering the various factors above to determine what fraction of the $500 penalty would appropriately penalize defendants with a greater degree of culpability when the harm is not merely
compensable.397
390. See, e.g., Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Technical Ceramics Corp., 723 F.
Supp. 2d 1284, 1329 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (explaining how enhanced damages can be awarded
for willful infringement).
391. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (“A patentee need not negate every possibility that the purchaser might not have purchased a product other than its own, absent the infringement. The patentee need only show
that there was a reasonable probability that the sales would have been made ‘but for’ the
infringement.”).
392. See Cotter, supra note 260, at 193; Presidio, 56 F.3d at 1338.
393. Kublin, supra note 210, at 89 (“Rather than a remedy based on the number of
mismarked articles, the amount of damages should reflect the culpability of the infringer.
That way, qui tam plaintiffs would have a financial incentive to bring suit against those
individuals causing the most social harm. This is consistent with the original intention of the
false marking statute, which was to protect society from the harms of false markings by
encouraging qui tam litigation against injurious defendants.”).
394. See supra Part V.C.; Granaghan, supra note 30, at 497-98.
395. Teichner, supra note 135, at 1414 (“Finally, § 292 penalties do not compensate
the government for damages it suffered directly as a result of the defendant’s alleged acts of
false marking, which further supports the punitive nature of this statute.”).
396. O’Neill, supra note 36, at 26.
397. See Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(“By allowing a range of penalties, the statute provides district courts the discretion to strike
a balance between encouraging enforcement of an important public policy and imposing
disproportionately large penalties for small, inexpensive items produced in large quantities.
In the case of inexpensive mass-produced articles, a court has the discretion to determine
that a fraction of a penny per article is a proper penalty.”).

248

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

33

As a matter of fact, courts were in the midst of utilizing this flexibility
to penalize defendants on a per article basis, typically considering many of
the factors above.398 For example, the district court in Bon Tool, on remand,
found that the proper penalty per falsely marked product was $180, the
highest price at which the product had originally been sold.399 Whereas, the
district court in Presidio Components, Inc. v. American Technical Ceramics
Corp. used the penalty recommended by the defendant’s expert: 32% of the
product’s average sale price.400 In both cases, the court noted that the penalty amount was high enough to deter future false marking by the defendants,
consistent with the public policy “embodied” in Section 292, but not so
high as to impose disproportionate liability.401 Just these two examples
demonstrate the workability of the Bon Tool per article liability interpretation, which can be used in situations where false marking is accompanied
by greater culpability or more substantial public harm.
E.

VIRTUAL MARKING AND POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES

1.

Virtual Marking and Its Concerns

As illustrated above, virtual marking offers a promising outlet for
manufacturers to mark products and avoid false marking litigation.402 As
also given above, though, virtual marking presents a few unique problems,403 and these in particular should be addressed in any future amendments to the FMA regardless of this Comment’s proposed changes. This
section continues to advocate for utilizing virtual marking in the future
while additionally presenting a few caveats.
As the lone commentator on this new marking has explained, there are
a few major problems that may arise from using this marking type: an
overwhelming amount of patent numbers on a website could potentially
mislead or misinform the public; broken links and a lack of updated patent
398. See O’Neill, supra note 36, at 28. The factors that O’Neill offers in making a
determination of per article penalties are surprisingly similar to Professor Cotter’s and Winston’s given above and include: “the extent of falsely marked advertising, the duration of the
false marking,” the resulting profits on the falsely marked products, the penalty’s impact on
a defendant’s business, the strength of the evidence of culpability, “whether any competitors
or potential competitors incurred any actual harm as a result of the false marketing,” and
whether the public was actually deceived. Id. at 28-29.
399. Forest Grp. v. Bon Tool Co., No. H-05-4127, 2010 WL 1708433, at *2 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 27, 2010).
400. Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Technical Ceramics Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d
1284, 1335 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
401. Id. at 1334-35; Bon Tool, 2010 WL 1708433, at *2.
402. See supra Part IV.B.4.
403. McCaffrey, supra note 23, at 384.
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information could frustrate the FMA’s purpose of availability of public
information; website access could open the door for collecting private information from individuals; and a lack of relevant information on a website
may continue to misinform the public and be as useless as no marking at
all.404 It is therefore essential that Congress (or federal courts going forward) provide some sort of virtual marking standards in order to supply
sufficient public notice under Sections 287 and 292.405 For example, a
standard virtual marking website or a “public virtual marking product registry” could be created to allow for a solution to some of these concerns.406
In analyzing the benefits of the virtual marking medium and in trying
to avoid similar problems of mismarking as those experienced in the recent
past, this “lone commentator” generally has it right. If Congress were to
amend Section 287 or 292 in the near future, it should seriously consider
providing limits on the amount of patent numbers per website, requiring
minimum site maintenance, supplying website accuracy requirements, and
providing specific privacy guidelines.407 Although a solution like a public
registry may be expensive to taxpayers and the alternative (such as private
websites) may be burdensome on manufacturers,408 it may very well be
worth it if it can help alleviate another surge of false marking trolls in the
future or at least easily provide the public useful patent information.
2.

Tacking on Sufficient Executive Branch Safeguards

Moving back to the constitutional discussion in Part II of this Comment, it is clear that the primary problem regarding the constitutionally of
qui tam actions is the amount of executive control needed to satisfy Morrison and the Take Care Clause of Article II.409 As an alternative to this
Comment’s proposed changes, or if Congress ever reinstates the qui tam,
the constitutional question (and quite possibly the troll problem) may be

404. See generally id. at 394-97.
405. See id. at 394.
406. Id.
407. See id. at 398. Specifically, McCaffrey proposes adding the following provisions to Section 287:
(1) the Internet posting shall be restricted to a reasonable number of patent numbers, (2) the Internet host shall take reasonable measures to
guarantee reasonable uptime for the posting, (3) the Internet host shall
maintain accurate records of all revisions to the posting, and (4) the Internet host shall not collect information about the public for accessing
the address.
Id.
408. McCaffrey, supra note 23, at 399-400.
409. See supra Part II.B.
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solved by merely adding executive branch control options regarding false
marking claims.410
As many of the federal circuits have held, the FCA already has these
control mechanisms in place,411 and since the FCA was amended in 1986 to
encourage more qui tam litigation, it has been relatively successful.412 As
mentioned previously, the FCA requires that notice of the suit be given to
the Department of Justice immediately, and the government has sixty days
to decide whether to intervene in the suit and take over the litigation.413
Hypothetically, Congress could amend Section 292 to provide for the same
government option (after reinstating the qui tam provision of course) while
continuing to provide other incentives to qui tam relators to enforce Section
292.414 For example, Congress amended the FCA by increasing its monetary incentives for relators, lowering its intent requirement for liability, and
lessening its jurisdictional requirements, but Congress did not change the
amount of government control over FCA claims, which prevented the troll
problem that the courts recently saw with false marking claims.415 If Congress and federal courts are hesitant to reinstate the qui tam provision in the
FMA because of this marking troll problem or the constitutionality problem, amending the FMA to provide for greater executive branch control
may be one possible answer.
3.

The Lanham Act

As at least one commentator has pointed out, the Lanham Act may be
another option for plaintiffs that wish to dispel false marking from the marketplace.416 A few courts have allowed for Lanham Act claims alongside
false marking claims;417 however, the Federal Circuit has stated that false

410. See Deming, supra note 213, at 215 (suggesting Congress could amend the
FMA to give the government a right to intervene in false marking cases and the power to
dismiss them).
411. See supra Part II.B.1.
412. By 2009, $8.4 billion had been recovered by the government from over 4,700
qui tam cases. Winston, supra note 130, at 141.
413. Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 173, at 304.
414. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 178, at 561-62 (discussing the 1986 incentives for
qui tam litigants under the FCA).
415. Id.; Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 173, at 325-26. Callahan & Dworkin, in
particular, explain that the government can challenge claims that may not have any merit
and, upon a finding of a frivolous claim, a relator could be assessed the defendant’s court
costs and attorney’s fees. Id.
416. See Grant, supra note 21, at 296.
417. See, e.g., Blank v. Pollack, 916 F. Supp. 165, 172 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that
false marking claims fall within the scope of the Lanham Act).
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patent marking “is not a per se violation of the Lanham Act.”418 Some
commentators are perplexed by the fact that more plaintiffs have not utilized the correlation of the two acts,419 but there are a couple of good reasons why this might be.
The purpose of the Lanham Act is similar to the FMA in that it tries to
prevent consumer deception in the marketplace by eliminating false advertising.420 Falsely marking items as patented is similar to false advertising in
that it also sends a message to a potential purchaser that the marked product
has some exclusive feature that it actually does not.421 Generally, the Lanham Act requires several elements to be met that center on proving harm by
a person’s materially false or misleading advertising statement that is likely
to influence a consumer’s purchasing decision.422
Some see these requirements as a lower burden of proof for Lanham
liability than Section 292, especially because only a likelihood of damage
or consumer deception is needed.423
But it must also be noted that the Lanham Act places similar and additional barriers on a plaintiff seeking damages such as actually proving some
level of harm, demonstrating the marking was material, and showing a
higher level of causation of the harm.424 Courts recently have also been
requiring a showing of “bad faith” on the part of a defendant.425 Problems
of preemption and higher pleading standards under Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

418. Proportion-Air, Inc. v. Buzmatics, Inc., No. 94-1426, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
25871, at *7 (Fed. Cir. June 14, 1995).
419. See Cotter, supra note 260, at 197-98.
420. See Grant, supra note 21, at 301; Deutsch, supra note 228, at 851. Additionally,
see the provisions of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1125), which pertain to
civil actions for violations.
421. Deutsch, supra note 228, at 851.
422. See id. Specifically, a plaintiff must prove that:
1) the defendant has made false or misleading statements of fact
concerning his own product or another’s; 2) the statement actually
deceives or tends to deceive a substantial portion of the intended
audience; 3) the statement is material in that it will likely influence
the deceived consumer’s purchasing decisions; 4) the advertisements
were introduced into interstate commerce; and 5) there is some causal
link between the challenged statements and harm to the plaintiff.
Id. (quoting Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd.
of Podiatric Surgery, Inc., 185 F.3d 606, 613 (6th Cir. 1999).
423. See Grant, supra note 21, at 298.
424. Deutsch, supra note 228, at 851-52.
425. See, e.g., DP Wagner Mfg. v. Pro Patch Sys., 434 F. Supp. 2d 445, 461 (S.D.
Tex. 2006) (“To impose state law or Lanham Act liability on a patentholder for less than bad
faith mismarking would penalize patentholders for engaging in conduct that the Patent Act
does not proscribe and would therefore impermissibly conflict with federal patent law.”).
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Twombly426 also play into the mix, further demonstrating that the Lanham
Act may not be the strongest route to limit false marking.427
VI.

CONCLUSION

There is little doubt that the false marking troll problem has been getting out of hand.428 Although it could have been argued that this was a sign
that the qui tam provision was working, these relators might have actually
been doing more harm to the general public than good in filing these false
marking claims.429 Defendant manufacturers put considerable time, money,
and resources into trying to calm the storm and avoiding expensive patent
litigation.430 With limited victories in the Federal Circuit and in the wake of
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, it appeared that both the Federal
Circuit and the Supreme Court would not offer much of a helping hand to
potential false markers by deeming Section 292 unconstitutional.431 The
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act spelled relief for those combating the
new “cottage industry” of trolls, but its many shortcomings may prove more
detrimental to Section 292, and subsequently to the public good, than an
onslaught of qui tam false marking suits.432
This Comment’s proposed changes offer some solutions to the shortcomings of the America Invents Act regarding Section 292, while still preventing a resurgence of the trolls. These fixes, like the recent amendments,
will likely solve the constitutional problems of the FMA by requiring some
feasible injury of plaintiffs that is not merely hypothetical.433 Lowering
Section 292’s intent requirement to dissolve the fraudulent intent barrier
that plaintiffs have struggled with for decades would be more consistent
with the public policy purpose of the FMA and would allow some flexibility in determining damages.434 Further amending Section 292 to allow for
compensable damages and a form of punitive damages on a per article basis
would also provide flexibility for courts in assessing damages without unintentionally subjecting the statute to dormancy, which plagued much of the
426. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
427. See, e.g., Champion Labs., Inc. v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 10-CV-02371-OWWDLB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52853, at *44-45, *49 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2011) (dismissing a
Lanham claim because it was based solely on false marking and was therefore preempted,
and because the complaint failed to adequately plead facts showing the defendant’s bad faith
and consumer reliance under the requisite pleading standards).
428. See supra Part II.B; Part V.A.1.
429. See supra Part V.A.1.
430. See supra Part II.B.
431. See supra Part III.B.4.
432. See generally supra Part IV.
433. See supra Part V.A.2.
434. See supra Part V.C.
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statute’s long history.435 In turn, more flexible damages would create
enough incentive for competitors and non-competitors alike to enforce the
FMA without defendants necessarily worrying about excessive awards
based solely on a “per article” basis.436 Ultimately, these changes would
shield defendants from harassment and frivolous lawsuits by requiring
plaintiffs to prove a form of injury, but still offer enough incentives for
competitors to file suit and compel manufacturers to keep their patents updated for the public interest.437 By making the appropriate statutory changes
and encouraging virtual marking in the present virtual age, it is possible to
make the False Marking Act as effective as its partner, the False Claims
Act, without the threat of patent trolls scouring local supermarket shelves.
KEVIN ZICKTERMAN
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